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Summary
This thesis studies the effect of expropriation risk on private investment. The rst chapter uses
a Real Options model to assess the importance of private provision and the impact of expro-
priation risk on investment timing, project value, governmental costs and social welfare. The
model is built considering two types of businesses (essential and non-essential) and two stages
(operating and investment opportunities) and answers questions regarding three main topics:
the rm’s reaction to expropriation risk, the government drivers to expropriate, and the costs
expropriation generates in terms of welfare. The results show that the rm makes suboptimal
investment decisions in the presence of expropriation risk. Once reputational costs of expropri-
ation are endogenized, the government’s decision regarding the level of political risk will largely
depend on the type of business. However, in terms of welfare, it is never optimal to expropriate.
The second chapter addresses the question of how different scal incentives affect private in-
vestment in a context of expropriation risk. This is done by extending the analysis of the rst
chapter: a real options model where the rm’s decisions and the government’s decision to ex-
propriate can interact. We nd that incentives implying a higher level of expropriation risk are
associated with a lower value of the investment opportunity of the rm, even though there is an
improvement in the operating rm’s results. Therefore, although the optimal decision for the
economy as a whole is to offer a safe political environment for investors, if expropriation risk
cannot be taken out of the picture, scal incentives that do not exacerbate political risk will be
the best option to attract investment.
Finally, the third chaptermeasures the impact of warnings of expropriation and of forced divest-
ments of private property on the stock prices of the parent company. It uses a unique database
of 116 events in 12 countries from 2005 to 2013. Results show signicant negative effects on the
stock prices of different kinds of warnings; the largest effect is when the warning takes the form
of a transitory permit revocation. In the case of forced divestments, there is signicant negative
impact when a permit is permanently revoked. However, nationalizations seem to generate a
positive market reaction.
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Resumen
Esta tesis estudia el efecto del riesgo de expropiación en la inversión privada. El primer capítulo
utiliza un modelo de Opciones Reales para determinar la importancia de la provisión privada
y el impacto del riesgo de expropiación en la elección del momento oportuno para invertir, el
valor del proyecto, los costos gubernamentales y el bienestar social. El modelo se construye
considerando dos tipos de negocios (esencial y no-esencial) y dos etapas (operativa e inversión)
y responde preguntas relacionadas con tres temas principales: la reacción de la rma al riesgo de
expropiación, los motivos del gobierno para expropiar, y los costos que genera la expropiación
en términos de bienestar. Los resultados muestran que las decisiones de inversión de la rma
son subóptimas en presencia de riesgo de expropiación. Una vez se han endogenizado los costos
de reputación, la decisióndel gobierno con respecto al nivel de riesgopolítico dependerá en gran
medida del tipo de negocio. Sin embargo, en términos de bienestar, nunca es óptimo expropiar.
El segundo capítulo se enfoca en la pregunta de cómodiferentes incentivos scales afectan la in-
versión privada en un contexto de riesgo de expropiación. Esto se realiza extendiendo el análisis
del primer capítulo: un modelo de opciones reales donde las decisiones de la rma interactúan
con la decisión de expropiar del gobierno. El modelo muestra que que los incentivos scales
que implican un nivel mayor de riesgo de expropiación están asociados con un menor valor de
la oportunidad de inversión de la rma, aunque hay una mejoría en los resultados operativos.
Por lo tanto, aunque la decisión óptima para la economía en general es ofrecer un ambiente
político libre de riesgo, si la expropiación no se puede eliminar completamente, los incentivos
scales que no incrementen el riesgo político serán la mejor opción para atraer a la inversión
privada.
Finalmente, el tecer capítulomide el impacto de las advertencias de expropiación y de las desin-
versiones forzosas de propiedadprivada sobre los precios de la acción de la casamatriz. Para ello
se utiliza una base de datos única de 116 eventos en 12 países, entre 2005 y 2013. Los resultados
muestran efectos signicativos adversos en los precios de las acciones para diferentes tipos de
advertencias, siendo las revocaciones transitorias de permisos de operación las que generan la
mayor reacción del mercado. En el caso de las desinversiones forzosas, existe un impacto nega-
tivo signicativo cuandounpermiso de operación es revocadopermanentemente. Sin embargo,
las nacionalizaciones parecen generar una reacción positiva del mercado.
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Introduction
Political risk can be dened as the risk that actions of agents pursuing political objectives affect
the value of assets of agents pursuing economic objectives (Correia et al., 2012). Given its am-
ple denition, the expressions of political risk are generally classied into four main categories
(Root, 1972; Baas, 2010). First, violence risk is associated with violent acts with a political origin
that lead to the impairment of rms’ assets or render businesses non-operational (Baas, 2010).
Second, the uncertainty of being able to repatriate resources from the host to the home coun-
try is categorized as transfer risk (Baas, 2010; Tomz and Wright, 2010; Clague et al., 1996). Third,
policies, governmental procedures or regulations that affect the results of investment, but not
its ownership, constitute operational political risk (Root, 1972; Jensen, 2003). And fourth, when
there is a possibility to be deprived of property or control rights of a facility in the host country,
political risk is labeled expropriation risk (Truitt, 1970; Kobrin, 1980; Hajzler, 2012).
Since the many expressions of political risk can severely inuence the value of investments in
host countries, it is only reasonable to expect that nancial markets be affected by political vari-
ables. For instance, a lower level of political risk in a host country seems to lead to higher stock
returns (Lehkonen and Heimonen, 2015) and to a smaller cost of debt for rms operating there
(Qi et al., 2010); democratic regimes are associated with larger FDI –Foreign Direct Investment–
inows (Jensen, 2003), and democratic presidencies tend to generate larger excess returns in
the stockmarket than republican presidencies (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003). Political events
also cause nancial markets to react. At the market level, the election of a candidate that is con-
sidered market-friendly has been shown to positively impact stock market returns (Jensen and
Schmith, 2005). At the rm level, authorization of U.S. backed-coups (Dube et al., 2011) and an-
nouncements of political appointments in the U.S. (Luechinger andMoser, 2014) seem to induce
positive abnormal returns for the implicated rms.
This thesis forms a part of the literature exploring the relationship between political risk and
private investment, with a focus on expropriation risk. In general, expropriations should have
a negative effect on rms’ value. From the perspective of a parent rm with a subsidiary at risk
of being expropriated, value losses come from several fronts. On the one hand, it experiences
the loss of future cash ows generated by the subsidiary. On the other hand, it is very unlikely
that the parent rm obtains a fair compensation for the expropriated rm; should it be granted
amicably by the host government, it will probably be below fair value, but in most cases it has
to be pursued in international arbitration –with no guarantee of getting it. From the subsidiary’s
perspective, the loss of value due to expropriation occurs if the public administration is relatively
less efcient than private agents, which seems to be the rule (Shleifer, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000). In fact,
Gao and Kling (2008) show that nationalizations in China are associated with negative abnormal
returns on the stock prices of nationalized rms.
Nevertheless, it is not only rms that face costs related with expropriation, governments can
also experience these costs in several forms. First, the government’s relative inefciencymay be
increased by the loss of intangible assets, like know-how and managerial skills (e.g., Raff (1992)),
or by retaliation of international investors in nancial or commodities markets –the case of the
3
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Argentinian government facing at least a 20% increase in the cost of Liqueed Natural Gas after
Repsol decided to cancel its supply following the expropriation of YPF. Second, there is a cost
related with indemnities paid by the government if expropriations occur, as well as legal costs
inherent to international arbitrations. Third, and nally, governmentsmay also bear reputational
costs. On the one hand, expropriating leaders may face political costs, like audience costs in
democracies (Jensen, 2008). On the other hand, there is empirical evidence that expropriation
risk reduces private investment. Gastanaga et al. (1998) report a negative relationship between
inows of FDI and nationalization risk, andAllee and Peinhardt (2011) show that both present and
past disputes in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) reduce
the level of FDI directed to non-OECD countries. This means that reneging on contracts and
expropriating, among other actions, does create a stigma for these countries.
In that spirit, the second chapter of this thesis aims to answer questions regarding the theoret-
ical drivers and costs of expropriation risk, by constructing a Real Options model of sequential
investment, and analyzing the interactions between the entry and exit options of a rm, and the
government’s option to expropriate. This is studied in an economy with two economic sectors:
essential and non-essential. Non-essential activities are those that, although creating value, are
not necessary for the normal functioning of the economy. This special characteristic will be re-
ected in the decisions made by the government regarding expropriation. As far as we know,
the problem of how the government’s decision to expropriate is affected by different "social in-
centives" has not yet been analyzed.
The results of our model aid to the more realistic strand of the literature1 where rms react to
expropriation by partially withdrawing investment, or underinvesting (Raff, 1992; Thomas and
Worrall, 1994). In the real options model we construct, this problem of underinvestment is ob-
served because the rm invests too early and abandons too soon comparedwith the case where
there is no expropriation risk. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no reference in the
literature to the possibility that rms have a smaller scope for losses (reected in the abandon-
ment decision) when the government creates a threat to expropriate its assets.
We also add to the literature on the costs of expropriation by endogenizing the costs the govern-
ment bears for creating the risk of expropriation. Several authors consider that the government
faces a reputation cost in terms of investment. Such costs are usually assumed to be exogenous
(Schnitzer, 2002; Clark, 2003; Schwartz and Trolle, 2010). In ourmodel, not only do we consider
exogenous reputation costs, but also go further by proposing a loss/gain function for the govern-
ment that allows analyzing the interaction between reputation costs and indemnity payments.
This loss function accounts for the reaction of rms operating in the market and rms willing
to enter, which incorporate the risk of being expropriated when one rm is threatened. We can
do this thanks to the interaction among the indemnity payment, the probability of expropriation
and the probability of shutting down the business. Thus, our loss functionmakes the compensa-
tion offered upon expropriation contingent on reputation costs. In this context, the government
can derive the optimal policy in terms of indemnity payments to maximize its own gain from
expropriation. We can also determine the optimal policy in terms of welfare, although this is
more of a normative result, since we assume the government to be opportunistic.
The results of our model show that when the business is essential for the functioning of the
economy, there is a greater welfare gain with a private, more efcient rm operating the project
than when the business is not essential. Therefore, creating a threat to expropriate is also more
costly in terms of welfare for essential businesses. This is in line with the results we obtain by
endogenizing the reputation and indemnity costs: for essential businesses, the government’s
optimal policy to maximize its gain is generally to expropriate the rm instead of conscating it:
it is bound to offer a rather fair compensation, especially if the market is large. However, when
the business is not essential, the government generally maximizes its gain by conscating the
rm or paying a low compensation, whatever the size of the market.
The development of the second chapter (Restrepo et al. (2015)) serves as a base for the third chap-
ter of this thesis, which aims at determining the benets of offering scal incentives to attract
private investment when there is expropriation risk in the business environment. This matter of
1Another strand assumes that the rm withdraws all investment from the host country, usually making it return to
autarky (e.g., Cole and English (1991); Schnitzer (2002); Guriev et al. (2011); Stroebel and van Benthem (2010))
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analysis is motivated by the well established fact that rms are interested in foreign investment
to seize economic advantages, but that these advantages can be affected by local conditions, like
political factors (Jensen, 2003). In that sense, it should not be surprising to see governments
offering generous incentives to compensate for the lack of appropriate conditions for invest-
ment –either political or economic (Li, 2006). For instance, Raff and Srinivasan (1998) nd that
tax incentives are especially likely to be observed in countries with high country risk, and Janeba
(2002) argues that low credibility may lead countries to offer upfront subsidies because they
are not attractive sites to investors. Yet, rms are usually aware that these special conditions are
tricky, and that theywill be subject to –at least creeping– expropriation (Engel and Fischer, 2010).
If this is so, our setting serves as the perfect way to model the relationship between a rm and
an expropriating government offering incentives to attract investment.
Although the effect of scal incentives on private investment has beenwidely analyzed (Agliardi,
2001; Agliardi and Agliardi, 2008; Panteghini, 2004; Pennings, 2000; Sarkar, 2012), little has been
done on governments using scal incentives as a compensation for weaknesses in the business
environment. Jensen and Johnston (2011), as far as we know, are the only authors addressing this
issue, by studying a problem inwhich the leader offers tax breaks to amultinational corporation
thatmaybe expropriated later on. Thus, basedon this problemandusing theRealOptionsmodel
in Restrepo et al. (2015), we study the effect of several scal incentives on both the government’s
decision to expropriate the business and the rm’s investment decisions.
In this setting, we answer questions regarding the real benets of using scal incentives to attract
investment if an expropriation may occur later on. We nd that if expropriation risk cannot be
taken out of the picture, scal incentives make the economy worse off by increasing the risk of
expropriation, as in Jensen and Johnston (2011). Therefore, in such a case, offering an incentive
that does not exacerbate expropriation risk is the best alternative. When we go on to determine
whether it ismore costly for the government to offer scal incentives and then engage in political
risk, than playing safe without offering incentives, we nd that when there are neither scal
incentives nor expropriation risk, the economy as a whole is better off, but the government is
considerably worse.
Finally, after studying the theoretical effects of expropriations on the rms’ value, the fourth
chapter of this thesis uses an empirical methodology to determine the impact of the expropri-
ation of subsidiaries on parent rms’ value. Although news on expropriation-related events are
likely to generate a market reaction with respect to the stock prices of both parent and sub-
sidiary companies, there is a lack of empirical evidence on this subject in extant literature; per-
haps Shcherbakova (2010) is the only one providing some preliminary evidence of the effect of
nationalizations, although with some shortcomings. This fourth chapter aims to ll this gap.
Specically, we investigate the short-term impact of events related to government expropriation
of private property on the stock prices of the publicly listed parent company by the means of a
unique database of 116 events in 12 countries from 2005 to 2013. The analysis of these events al-
lows for separating them into two broad categories: warnings and forced divestments. What we
call pre-expropriation warnings relate to references to expropriation or nationalization publicly
made by the government, but do not imply the denite loss of property or control rights over the
production unit. Thereupon, warnings may be followed by several government actions. These
are what we call forced divestments. Our basic hypothesis is that expropriation-related events
are bad news for future performance of parent companies and therefore their market value will
decrease when these events are known, except in the case where assets are sold to –instead of
seized by– the government.
Using this data, we measure the effect of expropriation-related events on parent rms’ stock
prices through an event study, a popular methodology to assess the impact of certain events on
stockholders’ wealth in the light of a given unanticipated event (see Brown and Warner (1980)).
The results we obtain support our basic hypotheses in almost all cases, nding signicant nega-
tive effects associated with several kinds of warnings. However, when we analyze forced divest-
ments, outright expropriations do not generate any signicant market response, while forced
sales seem to cause positive abnormal returns.
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Expropriation Risk, Investment
Decisions and Economic Sectors
2.1 Introduction
The wave of nationalizations in Africa and Latin America in the last decade has brought the fear
of expropriation back into the picture. An expropriation can be dened as government seizure
of the ownership or control rights of a rm. The problem it poses to investors is that compen-
sation for expropriation in most cases is either nonexistent or below the fair value of the rm.
Governments, in turn, nd it appealing that expropriations come with the immediate benets
they obtain from seizing the assets of the rm once investment costs have been sunk.
We use Real Options and build a version of a classical sequential investment timing model in
the spirit of McDonald and Siegel (1986) to investigate the investment decisions of a rm and a
government in the presence of expropriation risk. The rm decides when to undertake a new
investment project and has the option to shut it down if it is no longer protable. The govern-
ment must decide when to expropriate the project once it is in operation. With this model, we
answer three main questions about governments’ drivers for expropriations, rms’ reactions to
this phenomenon and the costs expropriation implies in terms of economic welfare.
The rst question is related to the drivers of governments to expropriate. The existing literature
approaches this question from several perspectives. For instance, governments can be consid-
ered social welfare or national incomemaximizers (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1984; Cole and English,
1991; Raff, 1992), risk averse agents looking for insurance (Rigobon, 2010; Stroebel and van Ben-
them, 2010), agents responding to political pressures to expropriate foreign rms (Engel and
Fischer, 2010; Jensen and Johnston, 2011), or even as punishing multinational rms that renege
on contracts (Guriev et al., 2011). An additional strand of the literature assumes an opportunistic
government trying tomaximize the value of an option to expropriate (Clark, 2003; Schwartz and
Trolle, 2010). Without delving deep into the discussion about the political and legal incentives
to expropriate, these authors focus on the operational and market factors that may encourage
the government to expropriate. Our paper forms part of this literature. Modeling a government
that expropriates the rm when cash ows are high, we study how the factors determining the
value of the investment project affect the expropriation decision.
Second, we analyze how rms react to expropriation. There are twomain options: (i) withdraw-
ing all investment from the host country and possibly making it return to autarky (e.g., Cole and
English (1991); Schnitzer (2002); Guriev et al. (2011); Stroebel and van Benthem (2010)) and (ii) par-
tially withdrawing investment, or underinvesting (Raff, 1992; Thomas and Worrall, 1994). In our
model, we observe a problem of underinvestment of the rmwhen there is a risk of expropria-
tion. This happens because the rm invests too early and abandons too soon comparedwith the
case where there is no risk. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no reference in the lit-
erature to the possibility that rms have a smaller scope for losses (reected in the abandonment
6
Chapter 2. Expropriation Risk, Investment Decisions and Economic Sectors
decision) when the government creates a threat to expropriate its assets.
In the settingwe propose, we are able to analyze how the rm’s decisions interact with the prob-
ability of expropriation, and vice versa, which is especially useful to answer the third question
in our model: what are the costs of expropriation for the government and the overall economy
in terms of reputation? Several authors consider that the government faces a reputation cost in
terms of investment. Such costs are usually assumed to be exogenous (Schnitzer, 2002; Clark,
2003; Schwartz and Trolle, 2010). In ourmodel, in addition to considering exogenous reputation
costs, we go further by proposing a loss/gain function for the government that allows analyzing
the interaction between reputation costs and indemnity payments. This loss function accounts
for the reaction of rms operating in the market and rms willing to enter based on the idea
that when one rm is threatenedwith expropriation, all remaining investors will account for the
risk of their assets being seized. We can do this thanks to the interaction among the indemnity
payment, the probability of expropriation and the probability of shutting down the project once
the expropriation risk has been included in the rm’s discount. Thus, our loss function makes
the compensation offered upon expropriation contingent on reputation costs. In this context,
the government can derive the optimal policy in terms of indemnity payments to maximize its
own gain from expropriation. We can also determine the optimal policy in terms of welfare,
which is dened as the sum of value created by both the government and the rm. Note that be-
cause the government is opportunistic, welfare is not one of its objectives. Therefore, thewelfare
maximizer policy is only a normative result.
The three questions above are studied in an economywith two types of businesses: essential and
non-essential. Non-essential activities are those that, although creating value, are not necessary
for the normal functioning of the economy. This special characteristic will be reected in the
decisions made by the government regarding expropriation. As far as we know, the problem of
how different "social incentives" of the government affect the decision to expropriate and the
investment decisions made by the rm has not been analyzed yet. In terms of costs borne by
the government, the most similar case is posed by Raff (1992), who analyzes the reaction of the
government and the rm within the context of asymmetric information: the government only
learns after expropriation whether it has expropriated the most costly rm to expropriate due
to the extra managerial skills the owners of the rm withdraw from the country. However, our
case does not assume asymmetric information.
The results of our model show that when the business is essential for the functioning of the
economy, there is a greater welfare gain with a private, more efcient rm operating the project
than when the business is not essential. Therefore, creating a threat to expropriate is also more
costly in terms of welfare for essential businesses. This is in line with results we obtain by endo-
genizing the reputation and indemnity costs: for essential businesses, the government’s optimal
policy to maximize its gain is generally to expropriate the rm instead of conscating it: it is
bound to offer a rather fair compensation, especially if the market is large. However, when the
business is not essential, the government generally maximizes its gain by conscating the rm
or paying a low compensation, whatever the size of the market.
In terms of welfare, however, regardless of whether the business is essential to the economy,
the government should always pay the highest possible compensation to the rm. Because the
offered indemnity has a negative relationship with the probability to expropriate, this implies
that expropriation will always be suboptimal in relation to total value creation in the economy.
2.2 Assumptions
The economy modeled comprises a government and private rms. We distinguish between
rms already operating and rms that are considering making an initial investment (entrants).
The investment opportunity is identied by the use of the subscript 0, while the values derived
from operating businesses will not have subscripts.
We consider two scenarios. The rst is the politically safe scenario, which we set as a bench-
mark and where the government does not intervene in the economy beyond setting the scal
regime. The second scenario is politically risky: an opportunistic government intervenes directly
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in the economy through expropriations. The risky environment is identied by the use of the
superscript j, with j = s, e representing a safe and a risky political environment, respectively.
Assumption 1. The government is an opportunistic agent.
Cole and English (1991) argue that governments can expropriate out of either desperation or op-
portunism. The opportunistic behavior, which is the most common, implies that expropriations
are mere reactions of the government to high real prices of the product or service. In terms of
our model, this implies that the government engages risky actions only when the cash ows of
the project exceed a certain threshold, whichwe call the expropriation trigger. When cash ows
are below the trigger, the government does not take any action and commits to its tax schedule.
Assumption 2. Political risk follows a continuous process.
In our model, the government observes the level of cash ows, and when it reaches a certain
level, it engages in politically risky actions. This is in contrast to models such as those by Clark
(1997, 2003) that dene political risk as a Poisson process. This approach is suitable only those
cases in which expropriation is regulatory.
Assumption 3. The government distinguishes between essential and non-essential businesses
and is committed to the operation of essential businesses.
According to economic sector, the government makes a distinction between essential and non-
essential sectors. The operation of businesses in essential sectors cannot be disrupted andmust
therefore be operated continuously either by a private investor or by the government. Non-
essential sectors are sectors, whose businesses generate value for the economy once in opera-
tion but are not required for the normal functioning of an economy. These businesses are only
engaged if it is protable to do so: the government may follow a scheme to maximize the value
of the project once it is operating and may abandon operations if the business is not protable.
Essential sectors are those every country requires, such as health-care, food-security, infrastruc-
ture, transportation, etc. The essential nature of these businesses does not imply the existence
of an altruistic government because opportunism drives governments to operate loss-making
essential businesses in order to perpetuate power 1. The economic sectors to which a business
belongs to are identied by the use of the superscript i, in which i = u, c representing essential
and non-essential businesses, respectively.
Assumption 4. The objective of the private rm is to maximize shareholder value.
For the private rmoperating in a safe political environment, there are no differences among any
of the sectors, because it does not bear any social responsibilities and can abandon the project
if it is no longer protable.
Assumption 5. The government commits to a tax scheme the rmmust comply with.
In the general case, the government’s income comprises corporate taxes. In some cases, how-
ever, depending on the type of activity, it may also charge royalties, which are usually charged
over public assets and when legislation determines a sovereign ownership of natural resources,
regardless of whether they are located on privately owned land (Rigobon, 2010; Postali, 2009).
Assumption 6. The rm has no outside opportunities.
Assumption 7. The government and the private rm are not nancially constrained.
Assumption 8. There are no informational asymmetries.
1In the case of democratic regimes, disruption to the essential sectors may trigger changes in the governing party in
the following elections and may generate costs for the revenues of the government through: (i) costs associated with
reduced investor condence in the country and capital ight (Le and Zak, 2006; Lensink et al., 2000) and (ii) reductions
in productivity if social unrest materializes in strikes and protests (Renn et al., 2011). In the case of autocratic regimes,
although there are no political cycles pressing the current governing party, there is a real fear of regime change through
social unrest.
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Both the government and the private rm know all the relevant information and rationally an-
ticipate each other’s reaction.
Assumption 9. The government is less cost-efcient than the private rm.
Although it may not be the rule, the conception is that private rms aremore efcient than pub-
lic enterprises. Although in many cases these public enterprises are engaged in activities that
are not directly comparable with those of private rms, there are certain organizational features
that explain this government inefciency. It can be the result of transferring resources to actors
that provide political support to the government (Shleifer, 1998; Megginson, 2005) or even be-
cause public enterprises are not prot oriented, which may lead them to disregard productivity
maximization as an objective (Stiglitz, 2000).
Assumption 10. The project has uncertain cash ows, x, represented by a Geometric Brownian
motion
dx = µxdt+ σxdz (2.1)
where µ is the instantaneous growth rate of cash ows, σ is their standard deviation, and dz is the
increment of a standard Wiener process. We also assume that µ < r, with r being the constant
and known interest rate, allowing us to obtain nite solutions. We denote the return shortfall,
r − µ, by δ.
For both agents considered, namely, the government and the private investor, we determine
the values of an investment opportunity (G0(x), V0(x)) and an operating business (G(x), V (x)).
For the sake of conciseness, we briey describe the value of a general claim A in which A =
G,V for the cases of government and private investors, respectively. The following Ordinary
Differential Equations -ODEs -describe the value of this general claim in termsof the investment
opportunity A0 and operating business A.
0.5σ2x2A0xx + µxA0x − rA0 = 0 (2.2)
0.5σ2x2Axx + µxAx − rA+ pi = 0 (2.3)
where pi = ax+ b (Table 2.1) represents the cash ows accruing to each claim. The cash ows to
any agent, pi, comprise a variable component, a, associated with the behavior of the cash ows
x, and a xed component, b, that is independent of the evolution of x. Table 2.1 denes a and
b. Remember that according to Assumption 5, the government has a tax scheme to which it
is committed, and the rm must comply with it. This scheme consists of a corporate income
tax, τ , and a royalty fee, ρ, that may be applied to its gross revenue. Therefore, when the rm
operates the project, ax + b is the after tax revenue in the value equation V j(x) and the scal
revenue in the government’s valuation of the project, Gij(x). The xed component is related to
the operating costs of the project, cv , if it is operated by the private rm and cg if it is operated by
the government. Note that the basic difference between equations 2.2 and 2.3 is that the rst is
a homogeneous ODE (pi = 0) because it values an option to invest, which does not generate any
income.
Table 2.1: Specication of the ODE
A(x) a b
Gi(x) 1 −cg
V j(x) (1− ρ)(1− τ) −cv(1− τ)
Gij(x) (1− ρ)τ + ρ −cvτ
The general solution to both ODEs are, respectively:
Aj0(x) = B1x
β1 +B2x
β2 , (2.4)
Aj(x) =
ax
δ
+
b
r
+B3x
β1 +B4x
β2 , (2.5)
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with a and b as given in Table 2.1, and
β1 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
> 1, (2.6)
β2 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
−
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
< 0, (2.7)
β1 and β2 are the roots to the following characteristic polynomial
(
0.5β2σ2 + β
(
µ− 0.5σ2)− r)xβ = 0 (2.8)
Bj are constants to be determined given appropriate boundary conditions. For the investment
opportunity, zero is an absorbing barrier for the process: no prospect of prot in the future
makes the asset worth nothing. Thus, V (0) = 0. However, because β2 < 0, as x goes to zero, the
value function would go to innity. Thus, B2 is set equal to zero in order to prevent this from
happening. In the case of operations in a safe environment2 (j = s),B3 is also equal to zero. This
comes from imposing the condition below (2.9), which simply means that when the cash ows
are considerably high, the project will never be abandoned.
lim
x→∞ =
a
δ
x+
b
r
(2.9)
2.3 The benchmark cases
This paper considers two benchmark cases: public and private provision in a politically safe
environment. In the rst benchmark, both the realization of the initial investment and the ac-
tual operations are solely the responsibility of the government; in this benchmark, there is no
private participation. The second benchmark considers a private rm that realizes the invest-
ment and operates a business following a value maximization scheme, regardless of the type of
business considered; the governmentmerely regulates the economic environment in which the
rm operates. The government receives taxes and may receive royalties depending on the type
of business.
2.3.1 Public provision
The importance of analyzing public provision is twofold. First, it represents the dynamics of the
value of the business once it is operated by the government when the private investors abandon
or whenever the government decides to expropriate it. Second, it provides the benchmark to
assess the value of private participation in the economy.
The following proposition summarizes the value generated to the government in the essential
and non-essential business sectors.
Proposition 1. Public provision of operating businesses
The value of a business operated by a government in the essential sector is dened asGu(x) and
its value is given by,
Gu(x) =
x
δ
− cg
r
. (2.10)
The value of a business operated by a government in the non-essential sector is dened asGc(x)
and for x > xa its value is given by,
Gc(x) =
x
δ
− cg
r
−
(xa
δ
− cg
r
)( x
xa
)β2
(2.11)
2As we will show later, for the case of expropriation risk, this condition is dropped
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in which xa represents the abandonment trigger and is given by,
xa =
β2
β2 − 1
δcg
r
. (2.12)
Note the extra term in the equation for the government value in a non-essential business. This
term represents the value of the abandonment option, which does not exist if the business is
essential. Because an abandonment option gives the opportunity to stop losses, it adds value
to the business implying that this term is always positive. Therefore, the operating value of a
non-essential business is higher than the operating value of an essential business.
Before investments are realized, the value for the government represents the value of an invest-
ment opportunity, summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Public provision before investment is realized
The value of an investment opportunity for a government in an essential business is dened as
Gu0 and for x < x
u
I its value is given by,
Gu0 (x) =
(
xuI
δ
− cg
r
− Ig
)(
x
xuI
)β1
(2.13)
in which xuI represents the investment trigger and it is determined as,
xuI =
β1
β1 − 1
(
δcg
r
+ Ig
)
. (2.14)
The value of an investment opportunity for a government in a non-essential business is dened
as Gc0(x) and for x < x
c
I its value is given by,
Gc0(x) =
(
xcI
δ
− cg
r
−
(xa
δ
− cg
r
)(xcI
xa
)β2
− Ig
)(
x
xcI
)β1
(2.15)
in which the abandonment trigger xa is given by equation (2.12), and the investment trigger xcI is
numerically determined from the following implicit equation,
(β1 − 1)x
c
I
δ
−
(cg
r
+ Ig
)
β1 − (β1 − β2)
(xa
δ
− cg
r
)(xcI
xa
)β2
= 0. (2.16)
Because the operating value is higher for a non-essential business than for an essential one,
the investment trigger for a non-essential business is also naturally lower. Essential businesses
need to be operated regardless of the cash ow level they generate, implying that they may be
operated even under signicant with losses. Therefore, it is important to bemore prudent when
investing in essential businesses, which in this case can be expressed as requiring a higher initial
cash-ow level before undertaking the investment. Investment mistakes are more costly with
essential businesses because they cannot be abandoned. It is important for public planners to
bear in mind that they pursue welfare maximizing objectives because a government acting as
a value maximizer could be tempted to prioritize investments in non-essential businesses and
possibly neglect those that are essential to the economy.
2.3.2 Private provision in a safe political environment
This set-up allows assessing the impact and the costs of expropriation risk. We start by stating
the value accruing to the private rm and to the government once the business is operating in
proposition 3. We assume that the government imposes a tax scheme onto the rm that is held
as long as the rm is in operation: the rm’s cash inows are subject to a corporate income tax,
τ , and to royalties, ρ. Therefore, the terms (1 − ρ) and (1 − τ) represent the proportion of after
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tax cash inows of the rm. While most rms are subject to corporate income taxes, royalties
are only applied to certain types of economic activities. They can be considered a special scal
regime that arises from the fact that these resources are typically owned by national states that
lease production to private corporations, and this gives them the right to procure resource rents
3 (Postali, 2009; Rigobon, 2010). Examples of activities requiring royalty payments are typically
oil, gas and mining activities.
Proposition 3. Operating values when there is private provision in a safe political environment
The value of an operating rm for a private investor regardless of the type of business is dened
as V s(x) and for x > xsa its value is given by,
V s(x) =
(x
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
(1− τ)−
(
xsa
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)(
x
xsa
)β2
(1− τ) (2.17)
in which the abandonment trigger xsa is given by,
xsa =
β2
β2 − 1
δcv
r(1− ρ) . (2.18)
The value for the government if it is an essential business is dened asGus(x) and for x > xsa its
value is given by,
Gus(x) =
x
δ
ρ+
(x
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
τ
+
(
xsa
δ
(1− ρ)(1− τ) + cvτ
r
− cg
r
)(
x
xsa
)β2
. (2.19)
The value for the government if it is a non-essential business is dened as Gcs(x) and for cvcg >
1− ρ⇒ xa < xsa the value of Gcs(x) is given by,
Gcs(x) =
x
δ
ρ+
(x
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
τ
+
(
xsa
δ
(1− ρ)(1− τ) + cvτ
r
− cg
r
−
(xa
δ
− cg
r
)(xsa
xa
)β2)( x
xsa
)β2
(2.20)
in which the abandonment trigger for the government xa is given by equation (2.12).
For cvcg < 1− ρ⇒ xa > xsa the value of Gcs(x) is given by,
Gcs(x) =
x
δ
ρ+
(x
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
τ −
(
xsa
δ
(ρ+ (1− ρ)τ)− cvτ
r
)(
x
xsa
)β2
, (2.21)
The second terms of equations 2.17 and 2.19 to 2.21 are related to the abandonment option of
the rm. In eq. 2.17, this term represents the value of the option to the rm, and it will always
be non-negative because it adds value to the project. For the government equations, the second
term can be interpreted as the government’s valuation of the rm’s abandonment option. There
are some differences in this term, depending on the case. For an essential business (eq. 2.19),
the term will most likely be below zero4 because if the rm abandons, the government must
continue operations, disregarding protability. If the business is non-essential and the govern-
ment’s abandonment trigger is smaller than the rm’s (xa < xsa), then it will continue operating
the business; the second term in eq. 2.20 accounts for the foregone scal revenue and for the
value of its own abandonment option. Finally, if the government’s abandonment trigger is above
the rm’s trigger, then the valuation of the abandonment option captures the expected loss of
scal revenue from the rm’s abandonment.
Before investments are realized, the value of the investment opportunity accruing to the private
investor and the government is summarized in the following proposition.
3However, there are some cases in which the royalties belong to the private owner of the land. For instance, in the
U.S., private owners are allowed to have mineral rights.
4It may be positive if the private rm is very inefcient compared to the government or if royalties generate a suf-
ciently large distortion in the abandonment decision of the rm
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Proposition 4. Option values when there is private provision in a safe political environment
The value of an investment opportunity for a private rm regardless of the type of business is
dened as V s0 (x) and its value is given by,
V s0 (x) =
((
xsI
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
(1− τ)
)(
x
xsI
)β1
(2.22)
−
((
xsa
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)(
xsI
xsa
)β2
(1− τ)− Iv
)(
x
xsI
)β1
in which the abandonment trigger xsa is given by equation (2.18), and the investment trigger x
s
I
is numerically determined from the following implicit equation,
(β1 − 1) (1− ρ)(1− τ)
δ
xsI − β1
(
cv(1− τ)
r
+ Iv
)
(2.23)
−(β1 − β2)(1− τ)
(
xsa
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)(
xsI
xsa
)β2
= 0
The value of such an investment opportunity for the government in an essential business is
dened as Gus0 (x) and its value is given by,
Gus0 (x) =
(
xsI
δ
ρ+
(
xsI
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
τ
)(
x
xsI
)β1
+
((
xsa
δ
(1− ρ)(1− τ) + cvτ
r
− cg
r
)(
xsI
xsa
)β2)( x
xsI
)β1
(2.24)
The value of this investment opportunity for the government in a non-essential business is de-
ned as Gcs0 (x) and for
cv
cg
> 1− ρ⇒ xa < xsa its value is given by,
Gcs0 (x) =
(
xsI
δ
ρ+
(
xsI
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
τ
)(
x
xsI
)β1
+ (2.25)((
xsa
δ
(1− ρ)(1− τ) + cvτ
r
− cg
r
−
(xa
δ
− cg
r
)(xsa
xa
)β2)(xsI
xsa
)β2)( x
xsI
)β1
in which the abandonment trigger for the government xa is given by equation (2.12). The value
of this investment opportunity for the government if the economic sector is commodities for
the case cvcg < 1− ρ⇒ xa > xsa is
Gcs0 (x) =
(
xsI
δ
ρ+
(
xsI
δ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
τ
)(
x
xsI
)β1
−
((
xsa
δ
(ρ+ (1− ρ)τ)− cvτ
r
)(
xsI
xsa
)β2)( x
xsI
)β1
(2.26)
Numerical results: base case and comparative statics
The following table presents the operating values (V S , Gc and Gu), option values (V S0 , G
c
0 and
Gu0 ) and abandonment (x
s
a) and investment (x
s
I ) triggers when investment is realized by a private
investor in a safe political environment. For the base case parameters, we assume gures aimed
at generating a typical business. The initial cash ow level (x0) is 1, its growth rate (µ) is 1% (follow-
ing Gorbenko and Strebulaev (2010)) and its volatility (σ) is 25% (following Eom et al. (2004)). The
corporate tax rate is 15%, the royalties are assumed to be 0% and the private investor is assumed
to be more efcient than the government in terms of operating costs (cv = 0.4 vs cg = 0.6) but
equally efcient in terms of investment costs (Iv = Ig = 20). Finally, the risk free interest rate (r)
is 6%.
Table 2.2 presents the results for the base case and the comparative statics. For the base case,
we see that the value of the government when the rm is operating a non-essential business is
larger than when the business is essential. As mentioned before, this is because the government
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does not have the possibility to decide whether to continue operating a business in the essen-
tial sector once the private investor abandons. In addition, for these base case parameters, the
rm’s abandonment trigger is lower than the government’s trigger for a non-essential business
because (i) the private rm is operationally more efcient (by assumption) and (ii) the royalties
are equal to zero (below the limit for xsa > xa, as in Proposition 1).
Table 2.2: Private provision: operating and option values, abandonment and investment triggers
Parameters xsa V
s(x) Gsu(x) xa G
sc(x) xsI V
s
0 (x) G
su
0 (x) G
sc
0 (x)
Base case 0.1736 11.738 1.098 0.26 2.071 3.4559 3.711 1.021 1.05
µ = 0 0.1973 9.092 0.221 0.296 1.604 3.6376 2.037 0.605 0.636
µ = 0.025 0.1314 18.8 2.861 0.197 3.318 3.2076 9.214 2.23 2.248
µ = 0.05 0.0421 79.342 13.976 0.063 14.002 2.8661 67.178 12.942 12.943
r = 0.02 0.0692 70.705 6.862 0.104 12.477 2.3472 58.529 10.313 11.587
r = 0.1 0.2149 6.185 0.721 0.322 1.091 4.6071 0.742 0.26 0.261
r = 0.14 0.239 4.175 0.552 0.358 0.737 5.7409 0.197 0.081 0.081
σ = 0.05 0.3061 11.333 2 0.459 2 1.9726 0.435 0.272 0.272
σ = 0.45 0.1021 12.769 -0.653 0.153 2.253 5.7128 6.948 1.436 1.566
σ = 0.65 0.0642 13.711 -2.109 0.096 2.42 8.7868 9.4 1.721 1.924
ρ = 0.12 0.1973 9.759 3.003 0.26 4.041 3.9271 2.961 1.656 1.677
ρ = 0.24 0.2284 7.799 4.864 0.26 5.956 4.5472 2.285 2.132 2.146
ρ = 0.36 0.2712 5.871 6.655 0.26 7.765 5.3998 1.687 2.44 2.449
τ = 0.05 0.1736 13.119 -0.283 0.26 0.69 3.1682 4.432 0.334 0.37
τ = 0.3 0.1736 9.667 3.169 0.26 4.143 4.0404 2.713 1.872 1.89
τ = 0.4 0.1736 8.286 4.55 0.26 5.524 4.5915 2.109 2.296 2.308
cv = 0.2 0.0868 14.262 1.937 0.26 2.517 3.0888 4.05 1.173 1.196
cv = 0.6 0.2604 9.444 0.556 0.26 1.667 3.8147 3.434 0.913 0.937
cv = 1 0.434 5.574 0.451 0.26 1.561 4.5144 3.007 0.769 0.777
cg = 0.2 0.1736 11.738 2.092 0.087 2.204 3.4559 3.711 1.05 1.05
cg = 0.4 0.1736 11.738 1.595 0.174 2.071 3.4559 3.711 1.036 1.05
cg = 1 0.1736 11.738 0.104 0.434 2.071 3.4559 3.711 0.992 1.05
Iv = 15 0.1736 11.738 1.098 0.26 2.071 2.7719 4.39 1.159 1.212
Iv = 25 0.1736 11.738 1.098 0.26 2.071 4.1377 3.234 0.913 0.93
Iv = 30 0.1736 11.738 1.098 0.26 2.071 4.8183 2.879 0.826 0.837
Notes: This table presents the operating values (V s, Gsu and Gsc), option values (V s0 , G
su
0 and G
sc
0 ) and abandonment
(xsa) and investment (x
s
I ) triggers. The base-case parameter values are as follows: the initial cash ow level x0 is 1, the
growth rate of cash ows (µ) is 1%, the volatility of cash ows (σ) is 25%, the operating costs for the private rm (cv ) are
0.4, the operating costs for the government (cg ) are 0.6, the risk free rate (r) is 6% and the investment cost (Iv ) is 20.
As can be observed in table 2.2, increases in the growth rate of the cash ows (µ) and decreases
in the risk free rate (r) and in the operating costs of the private investor (cv) are all associatedwith
increases in the value of the operating business and in the value of the investment opportunity
for both the government and the private investor. An increase in volatility (σ) increases the value
of the operating business for the private investor and for the government if the business is non-
essential. If the business sector is essential, the government only partially benets frompotential
increases in x through tax collection, but it bears the negative effects of decreases in x because
it is forced to operate the business following the abandonment of the private investor. The value
of the investment opportunity is increasing in σ for all agents.
Changes in royalties (ρ) and taxes (τ ) modify the distribution of value between the government
and the private investor, in which increases in τ or in ρ increase the value accruing for the gov-
ernment and reduce the value accruing for the private investor, regardless of the type of business
and regardless of whether the business is already operating or is still an investment opportunity.
However, the results show a Laffer curve for royalties: the value of the government increases
only up to a certain point when we vary ρ, meaning there is a point at which governments start
losing revenue as a result of rising royalty rates. We do not observe a Laffer curve for corporate
income tax because of the neutrality of abandonment to taxes.
In terms of the decisions to invest and to abandon, we observe that whenever a change in a pa-
rameter value translates into an increase in the operating value of the business, abandonment
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occurs later (decrease in xa) and investment occurs earlier (decrease in xI ). The exception comes
with higher volatility (σ), which, by increasing the value of both options, delays the exercise of
investment and abandonment. The other exception is related the neutral nature of the tax sys-
tem regarding the abandonment decision: because the corporate income tax is assumed to be
symmetrical, an increase in τ is associated with a decrease in the operating value for the private
investor, without translating into an earlier abandonment (xa does not change with changes in
τ ).
We have analyzed how changes in the base case parameters affect the decisions of the private
investor and the government in terms of investment and abandonment and how it affects the
value of these individual claims. Now, we consider additional measures that allow us to un-
derstand how private participation affects other aspects, such as investment timing, investment
volumes, costs for the government of allowing private participation and the welfare impact of
private participation.
2.3.3 Investment, public and welfare effects of private provision
Investment timing: In termsof investment timing,we analyzehowchanges affect the expected
time in which the investment is realized. We dene the expected time to investment as θ, and
we know (Pennings, 2000) that the expected time to investment can be determined as
θ =
ln(x0)− ln(xI)
µ− 0.5σ2 . (2.27)
Because we are concerned about the changes in the investment timing induced by private pro-
vision, we express our measure of timing as follows
Θs =
θv − θg
θg
=
ln(xgI)− ln(xsI)
ln(x0)− ln(xgI)
. (2.28)
IfΘs < 0, private provision accelerates the realization of investments relative to public provision,
otherwise investments are delayed.
Change in project’s value Thismeasures allows for determiningwhether the private operation
of the project implies a better result in terms of project value.
Hs = V s(x0)/G(x0)− 1. (2.29)
Cost for the government: The cost for the government regarding an individual rm represents
the difference between having private and public provisions. We dene this cost as Γ for an
operating business, and it is expressed as, Γ for an operating business and it is expressed as,
Γs = Gs(x0)−G(x0), (2.30)
the cost for an individual investment opportunity is dened as Γ0:
Γs0 = G
s
0(x0)−G0(x0). (2.31)
Inmost cases, there is an obvious opportunity cost for the government by ’allowing’ private rms
to operate protable businesses because the government forgoes all the earnings the business
generates in exchange for reduced tax revenues and/or royalties. However, the cost for the gov-
ernment should not be the most important driver of public decisions because different aspects
justify the importance of private investors, such as:
• Increasing the overall level of investments because the government may redeploy its re-
sources to other activities;
• Allowing governments to focus on their core activities, whichdonot imply generatingprof-
its;
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• Imposing less distortions on the economy by having the government competewith private
enterprises (double role of the government);
• Reducing the governmental budgets or budget decits.
Social Welfare: We dene social welfare as the overall value created by a business. We con-
sider this an aspect that should be high on the public agenda to support the decision making
process. Our measure of social welfare for an individual operating business is given by
Ωs = (V s(x) +Gs(x))−G(x) (2.32)
and the social welfare for an investment opportunity is
Ωs0 = (V
s
0 (x) +G
s
0(x))−G0(x) (2.33)
Altruistic governments that have the objective of maximizing welfare would focus on Ω. In turn,
an opportunistic government would focus on Γ.
Numerical results
Table 2.3 presents the effects of private provision in terms of investment timing (Θs), investment
volume (Hs), governmental costs and social welfare. The base case parameter values are the
same s used in section 2.3.1. The results show that the overall benets of private provision in
terms of timing (decrease in Θs), investment volumes (increase inHs) and welfare (increases in
Ωs and in Ωs0) are largely associated with relative private efciency and with a reduction in the
distortions introduced by taxes and royalties.
The existence of a more efcient private investor (cv < cg or Iv < Ig) leads to accelerated in-
vestments, higher investment volumes and increased welfare, and in most cases it also reduces
the government opportunity costs (Γs and Γs0). The relative importance of private efciency is
also clear when we compare the effects of increases in the growth rate of the cash ows (µ) with
the decreases in interest rates (r). In both cases, and regardless of the nature of the investment,
businesses are more valuable (operating and in still in the project), investments are accelerated,
investors are willing to commit to higher investments and welfare is increased. However, with
increases inµ, the benets of havingmore efcient private investors are diluted because only the
present value of the cash-in-ows is increased, and the value of higher operational efciency is
reduced. With decreases in r, both the cash-in and cash-out ows are affected by the changes
in r, and the differences in operating efciency remain important. This explains why the ben-
ets of private provision in terms of welfare (increase in Ωs and in Ωs0) are signicant when r
decreases and why the same benets are merely modest when µ increases. The same logic also
explains the higher benets of private provision in terms of investment timing (Θs) and invest-
ment volumes (Hs) for low r compared with high µ. This leads us to conclude that whenever
private investors are more efcient than a government, it is more important for a government
to stimulate private investment in a context of low interest rates than in a context of fast growth.
The existence of corporate taxes and royalties distorts the behavior of private investors in terms
of investments and abandonment decisions (royalties only in this case). For operating busi-
nesses, there is tax neutrality because the tax system is symmetrical and the government partic-
ipates in the gains and losses of the rm proportionally. Royalties are collected whether the rm
presents gains or losses, and therefore, abandonment is not neutral to royalties (see expression
2.18). Although a more efcient rm (cv/cg < 1) is expected to abandon later than a govern-
ment, royalties may change this, as reected in eq. 2.20. With high royalties, following private
abandonment x < xsa, the government operates the business while x > xa because the private
abandonment was inefcient due to the high royalties (cv/cg < 1−ρ). Unfortunately, as Rigobon
(2010) notes, politicians tend to favor royalties over taxes, although the distortions introduced by
royalties are well known in the existing literature. Bergstrom (1984)[p.177] argues that royalties
change the production plans of rms. For the case ofmining activities, "a systemof royalties (...) is
inefcient because it will induce mining companies to discontinue operations on mines before
it is economically appropriate to do so and will inhibit the development of marginally efcient
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mines". It is not surprising that a reduction in τ or in ρ is associated with accelerated invest-
ments (lower Θs), higher investment volumes (higherHs) and increased welfare (higher Ωs and
Ωs0 in the case of royalties and higher Ω
s
0 in the case of taxes). However, because taxes and roy-
alties represent the government’s income, reductions in τ and ρ are associated with important
increases in the governmental opportunity costs (decreases in Γs and Γs0).
Overall, the benets of private provision are more signicant in the case of essential businesses.
The difference in welfare is calculated as ∆Ωs0 = Ω
su
0 − Ωsc0 for investment opportunities and
∆Ωs = Ωsu −Ωsc for operating businesses. In terms of investment opportunities (Ωs0), the bene-
ts for essential businesses tend to outweigh those of non-essential businesses, apart from the
following cases: high Ig , low Iv , high cg , low τ and low r. In all these cases, private provision
accelerates investments signicantly relative to public provision, thus increasing the probability
that the government may have to operate the business following the abandonment of private
investors.
For operating businesses, the economy also experiences a higher welfare gain with the partic-
ipation of private investors in essential sectors. This can be explained by the fact that in these
businesses the government does not have the possibility to abandon evenwhen running impor-
tant losses. In general, a reduction in the value of the abandonment option for the government
mitigates the difference in welfare gains between the different sectors (higher µ and lower r and
σ). However, there are some exceptional cases in which the value of private investors gener-
ates the same social welfare value in both sectors. This happens when xa < xsa, that is, when
cv/cg > 1 − ρ. Therefore, the difference in welfare also depends on the relative efciency of
the private investors with respect to the government and on how distorting royalties are for the
abandonment decision. In the case of taxes, the difference in welfare is constant because they
are symmetric and do not have any effect on either of the abandonment options.
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2.4 Expropriation Risk
The model. Both the investor and the government have all the information keys ex-ante. The
only uncertainty in thismodel comes from the cash-ows. Therefore, the level of cash ows that
triggers the realization of investment for the private rm, xeI , is set knowing all of the following:
• The rm will be expropriated once the cash-ows reach xe, the expropriation trigger of
the government.
• If expropriation occurs, the government will pay an indemnity kv to the rm and will con-
tinue operating the project, facing higher operating costs, cg , and a reputational cost, kr ,
which is the consequence of a lower aggregate level of investment. Thus, the government
claim turns into that of Proposition 1minus the costs associatedwith expropriation risk (kv ,
kr).
• kv ∈ [0, V s(x)]. The two natural boundaries for the compensation are zero (conscation)
and the fair value of the project, V s(x).
• There is an abandonment trigger for the rm, xea, which also depends on the probability of
expropriation. As before, abandonment does not imply any cost for the private rm.
• Upon abandonment of the rm, the project will be operated by the government if (i) it
belongs to the utilities sector or (ii) if it is a commodity, and xea > xa.
An interesting feature of this model is the interaction between the abandonment trigger of the
private rm and the expropriation trigger of the government: upon operations, because there
is perfect information, the rm will anticipate whether the government is going to expropriate
earlier (xe low), and this will cause it to lean towards early abandonment (xea high). The triggers
mentioned in this case (i.e., xe, xea, x
e
I ) do not have an analytic solution, and theymust be obtained
by numerically solving a system of non-linear equations (see Appendix).
Proposition 5. Operating value of private provision with expropriation risk. The operating value
of a private rm exposed to expropriation risk by the government is
V e(x) =
(x
θ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
(1− τ) + E1xβ1 + E2xβ2 (2.34)
where E1 and E2 are constants given by the conditions on rm value at the moments of aban-
donment and expropriation. E1 is determined by the value of the private rm at expropriation,
V e(xe) = kv , while E2 arises from the value of the rm at abandonment, V e(xea) = 0. The aban-
donment trigger, denoted by xea, corresponds to the numerical solution of equation 2.35, which
comes from the smooth pasting condition that requires that ∂V
e(x)
∂x
∣∣
x=xea
= 0.
(1− ρ)(1− τ)
δ
+ β1E1x
eβ1−1
a + β2E2x
eβ2−1
a = 0 (2.35)
The value accruing to the government is given by
Gie(x) =
x
θ
ρ+
(x
θ
(1− ρ)− cv
r
)
τ + Ei3x
β1 + Ei4x
β2 (2.36)
in which the parameters E3 and E4 are again determined using the value matching conditions
for the government. The condition for E3 species the value of the government at the moment
of expropriation: Gie(xe) = Gi(xe) − kv − kr . The condition for E4 is that, at the moment of
abandonment of the private rm,Gie(xea) = G
i(xea). The expropriation trigger, xe, is numerically
determined by solving the following implicit equation
(1− ρ)τ + ρ
δ
+ β1E
i
3x
β1−1
e + β2E
i
4x
β2−1
e −
∂Gi(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xe
= 0 (2.37)
This equation is the result of the smooth pasting condition ∂G
ie(x)
∂x
∣∣
x=xe
= ∂G
i(x)
∂x
∣∣
x=xe
, which
simply states that not only the value but also the derivative of the government’s functions match
at the moment of expropriation.
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The constants in the value equations of the rm can be interpreted as follows. E1 captures the
private rm’s expected loss from the option to expropriate held by the government. Thus, it
should be below zero. Moreover, because β1 > 1, as the cash ows, x, increase, the expropriation
option will have a larger impact on the value of the project (the term E1xβ1 in eq. 2.34), on the
other hand, E2 captures the value of the abandonment option to the rm. As such, E2 will be
positive. Because β2 < 0, as the cash ows increase, the value of the abandonment option will
be close to zero, and vice versa.
The constants for the government’s equations have an analogous interpretation. E3 represents
the expected prot of the government from expropriating the project. Therefore, Ei3 will be
positive for both sectors. In addition, the term Ei3x
β1 will be increasing in cash ows (because
β1 > 1), so the higher the level of cash ows, the larger the impact of the option to expropriate in
the government’s value. In turn, the constant Ei4 can be interpreted as the valuation the govern-
mentmakes of the rm’s abandonment option. Because the government has a specic condition
upon the private rms’ abandonment for each sector, the values for essential and non-essential
businesses will be different. If the business is essential, the constant will be negative (Eu4 < 0)
because the government is forced to operate the business following the abandonment of the pri-
vate rm, but if the business is non-essential, then the constant will be positive (Ec4 > 0) because
of the abandonment option embedded in the government’s value. Again, because β2 < 0, the
termEi4x
β2 ∀ i = u, cwill be decreasing as cash ows increase, so the value of the abandonment
option is less important for high revenue states.
Proposition 6. Project value of private provision with expropriation risk
The claim for the private rm on the investment opportunity is given by:
V e0 (x) =

[
x
δ (1− ρ)− cvr
]
[1− τ ] + E1xβ1 + E2xβ2 − Iv if x ≥ xeI
[[xeI
δ (1− ρ)− cvr
]
[1− τ ] + E1xeβ1I + E2xeβ2I − Iv
][
x
xeI
]β1
if x < xeI
(2.38)
And the investment trigger, xeI comes from the implicit equation:
(β1 − 1)(1− ρ)(1− τ)
δ
xeI − β1
(cvτ
r
+ I
)
+ (β1 − β2)E2xeβ2I = 0 (2.39)
The claim for the government when the government is threatening with expropriate:
Gie0 (x) =

x
θ ρ+
(
x
θ (1− ρ)− cvr
)
τ + Ei3x
β1 + Ei4x
β2 if xeI ≤ x
[
xeI
δ ρ+
(
xeI
δ (1− ρ)− cvr
)
τ + Ei3x
eβ1
I + E
i
4x
eβ2
I
][
x
xeI
]β1
if x < xeI
(2.40)
In themodel, we include three types of costs of expropriation. The rst cost relates to the relative
inefciency of the government compared with the private rm and is implicit in the model.
This relative inefciency is due to two factors. On the one hand, there is a direct loss from the
project being run by a government, which is usually less efcient than private rms (Raff, 1992;
Stroebel and van Benthem, 2010; Schwartz and Trolle, 2010; Guriev et al., 2011). On the other
hand, retaliation following expropriations can increase the operating costs of the rm (e.g., Raff
(1992)). For instance, nancial markets may be closed for the country limiting its funding, or
even when still providing funds, these usually come at a higher cost (Tomz and Wright, 2010).
The same effect is also experienced in the market for raw materials and nished goods. Take
the case of Argentina and the expropriation of Repsol YPF. Following the expropriation, Repsol
refused to sell more liqueed natural gas to the government of Argentina, and the government
experienced an increase in the costs of approximately 26% on purchases of liqueed natural gas
from other suppliers.
The second cost is the reputational cost for the government, which we denote by kr . It is usually
considered as a reduction in private investment that occurs following expropriations. Empiri-
cal evidence of this reduction in private investments is presented in Gastanaga et al. (1998), who
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report a negative relationship between inows of FDI and nationalization risk in the 49 Least De-
veloped Countries (LDCs), and in Allee and Peinhardt (2011), who, although not focused purely
on expropriation, show that both present and past disputes in the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) reduce the level of FDI directed to non-OECD coun-
tries. This means that reneging on contracts and expropriating, among other actions, do cre-
ate a ‘stigma’ for these countries. At the theoretical level, this cost is accounted for in Schwartz
and Trolle (2010) as an exogenous quantity that reduces the value for the government, while in
Clark (2003), it is modeled as a Geometric Brownian Motion correlated with the value of the ex-
propriated subsidiary in order to account for the wide range of variables that affect the cost of
expropriation.
Finally, the third cost of expropriation is included in our model in the parameter kv . This pa-
rameter reects any costs associated with indemnities paid by the government at the moment
of expropriation and has been previously included in the works of Guriev et al. (2011), Engel and
Fischer (2010) and Schwartz and Trolle (2010). It is, together with taxes and royalties, one of the
control or decision variables of the government. While taxes and royalties have a direct impact
on the government’s cash-ows and, thus, on the level of political risk, kv is the key variable in
making decisions onpolitical risk. This variable is inversely related to the probability of expropri-
ation: the larger the indemnity paid to the private rm, the lower the probability of expropriation
(xe will be high). That is, if kv →∞, then xe →∞ andE1 → 0, whichmeans that for high levels of
kv , the results under expropriation will converge to the safe case of Proposition 3 (e.g., xeI → xsI ,
xea → xsa, V e(x) → V s(x)). If, instead, kv → 0 ⇒ xe → 0, the private rm would never enter
because this implies immediate expropriation.
2.4.1 The exogenous case
At this point, we consider all three costs to be exogenous. While the inefciency cost can be
easily dened as exogenous because it depends on variables that are beyond government con-
trol, for instance, due to employees’ weak incentives (see Shleifer (1998)), the reputation and the
indemnity costs can be closely related: a government that pays a fair compensation to the rm
after expropriation may have to bear a smaller reduction in investment afterwards. However,
there is at least some exogenous component in them. On the one hand, there may be legal costs
inherent to arbitration procedures associated with the indemnity payment. On the other hand,
political leaders in democracies may face audience costs, which are generated through the do-
mestic political process: "[e]ven if expropriations are politically popular, voters have the incentive
to replace political leaders with tarnished reputations" (Jensen, 2008, 1042). Autocrats expecting
to rule for a long time may also face a similar reputation cost by not protecting the property of
their subjects (see Clague et al. (1996)).
To analyze the effects of expropriation risk in the investment decisions of a rm, we set the base
case parameters so that the government offers a xed compensation in the case of expropriation
that is equal to half the fair value of the project at the initial cash ow level, kv = 0.5 ∗V s(x)), and
we assume the xed reputation costs to be kr = 5. Our results show that the rm’s investment
will be suboptimal when the government creates a threat of expropriation. By sub-optimality,
we mean that the rmwill invest earlier than in the safe case5 (xeI < x
s
I), but it will also abandon
the project earlier
(
xea > x
S
a
)
. On rst sight, this may seem a bit counter-intuitive. However, by
waiting longer to invest the rm exposes itself to a greater probability that the cash-ows will
drawcloser to the expropriation triggerxe, which increases the probability of being expropriated
sooner. Thus, the smaller scope to bear losses comes from a higher abandonment trigger. An
important consequence of this result is that because the government is obliged to undertake the
essential businesses upon the private rm’s abandonment, it will bemore costly to create threats
of expropriation of essential than of non-essential businesses.
Table 2.4 summarizes the results obtained for the case of expropriation and the dynamics of the
results. One of the most interesting aspects of this model is that it allows for analyzing the inter-
actions among xeI , x
e
a and xe. The results show that increases in the growth rate accelerate the
investment decision of the private rm and decelerate abandonment (lower xea and x
e
I ), despite
5Nordal (2001) obtains a similar result in that higher risk accelerates the investment decisions of the rm.
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the decrease in the expropriation trigger. The exact opposite effect is observedwhen the interest
rate increases: as explained previously, a larger discounting in costs comes along with an even
larger discount of benets, therefore delaying the decision to invest and rushing the decision to
abandon. This also explains why the expropriation trigger increases with increases in the inter-
est rates. Because the option to expropriate can be considered an American call option (Clark,
2003; Schwartz and Trolle, 2010), a higher volatility of cash ows delays both the decisions of
the private rm to invest and to abandon (higher xeI and x
e
a) and the decision of the government
to expropriate (higher xe).
For the scal variables, there is an interesting feature related to the expropriation trigger: higher
government take through both royalties (ρ) and taxes (τ ) reduces the incentives of the govern-
ment to expropriate. Raff (1992), Rigobon (2010), Stroebel and van Benthem (2010), and Schwartz
and Trolle (2010) arrive at a similar conclusion. The decision to abandon, however, depends on
the scal variable: while higher royalties increase the abandonment trigger, a higher tax rate
delays the decision to abandon. This difference comes from the less distortive nature of taxes:
under normal conditions, they do not affect the abandonment decision, which means the de-
crease in xea is solely the result of a lower probability of being expropriated (↓ xe). Efciency of
the private rm has a similar impact to that of royalties: the higher the operating costs, the faster
abandonment and expropriation occur. We interpret this result as evidence that mechanisms
such as transfer pricing, a formof tax avoidance,may be detrimental to the safety of private rms
because they are perceived by the government as attempts by the private rm to capture excess
rents and provingmore reasons to government to expropriate. As Rigobon (2010) notes, there is
often an incentive to seize rents from private corporations whenever the revenues they obtain
are perceived as excessive.
The values of the private rm (V e, V e0 ) and of the government (G
e, Ge0) increase with a higher rate
of return, with a lower interest rate and with a higher efciency of the private sector (lower cv
and Iv), just like in the case without political risk. However, with the threat of expropriation, the
dynamics related to the volatility of cash ows is somewhat different. The government value for
non-essential businesses shows the same dynamics as before, but the value of private rms is
affected negatively, and the government value for essential businesses now increases as volatility
increases. This is due to the option to expropriate, which increases in value as cashowsbecome
more volatile, as in Clark (2003) and Schwartz and Trolle (2010).
Regarding thedifferencesbetweenessential andnon-essential businesses, the government faces
different constraints, and this yields different incentives in each case. The government has a
higher expropriation trigger for essential than non-essential businesses. This means that expro-
priation is less likely to occur in a project that is considered essential for the functioning of the
economy because of the extra cost imposed by the lack of an abandonment option of the gov-
ernment. Note, however, that for the private rm, there are no signicant differences regarding
decisions of when to invest andwhen to abandon, and thus, the value ex-ante and ex-post is not
particularly affected either. This can be explained by the fact that although the probability of ex-
propriation is higher in the case of non-essential businesses, the difference is not large enough
for the rm to require additional compensation upon expropriation.
Investment, public and welfare effects of expropriation risk
The analysis regarding timing, volume of investment, and social welfare is performed based on
the measurements proposed in section 2.3.2. Therefore, we have:
Expected time to investment: shows the changes in the investment timing induced by expro-
priation risk
Θe =
θe − θs
θs
=
ln(xsI)− ln(xeI)
ln(x0)− ln(xsI)
. (2.41)
If Θe < 0, the private rm accelerates the realization of investments in the presence of expro-
priation, and if Θe > 0, investments are delayed relative to the safe case.
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Change in rm’s value: shows, in relative terms, the amount by which private investment is
reduced once expropriation is on the table.
He = V e(x0)/V
s(x0)− 1. (2.42)
Cost for the government: The cost for the government, Γe, shows the difference in value be-
tween the case of expropriation and the safe case. Thus, it can also be interpreted as the value
of the option to expropriate. For an operating business, it is expressed as:
Γe = Ge(x0)−Gs(x0), (2.43)
The cost for an individual investment opportunity is:
Γe0 = G
e
0(x0)−Gs0(x0). (2.44)
Social Welfare: In the same fashion, we dene change in social welfare as the change in total
value creation in the economy.
Ωe = (V e(x) +GE(x))− (V s(x) +Gs(x)) (2.45)
and the social welfare for an investment opportunity is given by,
Ωe0 = (V
e
0 (x) +G
e
0(x))− (V s0 (x) +Gs0(x)) (2.46)
Table 2.5 contains the effects of expropriation. First, investment is always reduced compared
with the safe case, as shown by the negative sign in He. This reduction is more apparent when
the change in parameter is associated with a lower expropriation trigger: a higher growth rate
and a lower interest rate, reduced costs of expropriation (low kr and kv), and lower revenues
for the government (low ρ and τ ). All these variables make expropriation more valuable for the
government (Γe and Γe0 increase).
Second, expropriation risk reduces total value creation (negative values for Ωe and Ωe0), except
when the private rm is very inefcient at the operational level relative to the government. In-
vestment efciency does not have the same impact. In addition, when both agents have the
same operating costs, the welfare loss in the economy is zero. This means that the reduction in
the investment volume of the private rm is fully counterbalanced by the increase in the value
of the government (through the value of the expropriation option).
Third, investment timing is negative in most cases, implying that in general terms, under the
threat of expropriation, the rm accelerates investment as predicted earlier. As expropriation
becomes less likely (high xe with respect to xeI ), our investment timing measure Θ
e goes to zero.
The only exception is the case of increases in volatility. The impact of higher cash-ow risk
affects the decision of the government to expropriate more dramatically (delaying it) than the
decision of the private rm to invest (accelerating it). However, overall, more volatile cash ows
increase the probability that expropriation will occur, thus generating an even higher accelera-
tion of the decision to invest in the case of political risk.
Finally, when comparing the two sectors, we observe that the private rm has nearly the same
results for both. However, in the very few occasions when there are differences in the invest-
ment volume, we can see that the greater reduction in investment happens in non-essential
businesses. Associated with this is the fact that the government’s expropriation option is more
valuable in non-essential business, where it holds the abandonment option. In line with these
results, thewelfare losses generated by the threat of expropriation are also higher in the essential
activities projects.
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2.4.2 The endogenous case for indemnity and reputational costs
In the previous case, we assumed that all the decisions in terms of indemnity and reputation
costs were exogenous, in the fashion of Schwartz and Trolle (2010), Guriev et al. (2011), and Clark
(2003). We now depart from the full exogenous case and analyze what the decision of the gov-
ernment would be in terms of indemnity. Thus, we make the compensation the government
would pay in the case of expropriation contingent on reputation costs (in terms of investment).
Because the probability of expropriation is closely related to the indemnity, with this function
the government can determine whether making expropriation more likely (by choosing a small
kv , and thus having a lower xe) is more costly. Remember that this government is not a benevo-
lent one and it behaves as a wealth maximizing agent. Therefore, the decision on the indemnity
is based on what the government perceives as gains from expropriating one rm. However, the
real impact in the economy of the expropriating risk is broader, so we also measure the total
gain/loss in the overall economy as a result of the threat to expropriate one rm. To construct
these measures, we assume that:
• There arem+ 1 rms operating in the economy and l rms willing to enter.
• The government has a target rm it wants to expropriate. Therefore, the expropriation
threat is directed only to such rm.
• The other rms in the market, whether operating or entrants, do not know that they are
not a target. Therefore, they behave as if theywere a possible target for expropriation, even
if the government disregards them as possible targets.
In terms of decision making, then, when determining kv , the government maximizes its gain
from expropriation. This means that it calculates a global value functionGg in which it accounts
for the net gain from expropriation as well as the possible gain/loss from creating the threat to
operating and entrant rms. Such function varies in kv so that the government can determine
the optimal value of the indemnity.
Gg = G
e(x)−Gs(x) +m (Gs(xea, x)−Gs(x)) + l (Gs0(xea, xeI , x)−Gs0(x)) (2.47)
In terms of welfare, the effects of expropriation are
Wg = (G
e(x) + V e(x)− (Gs(x) + V s(x))) (2.48)
+m (Gs(xea, x) + V
s(xea, x)− (Gs(x) + V s(x)))
+l (Gs0(x
e
a, x
e
I , x) + V
s
0 (x
e
a, x
e
I , x)− (Gs0(x) + V s0 (x)))
The idea here is that upon expropriation of one rm, the remaining rms react by reducing their
scope to bear losses. In a certain way, this can be explained by a smaller amount of investment
on the rm. Thus, it can be related to the result of Cole and English (1991), in whose setting
atomistic investors must decide every period on the additional investment they will place in the
host country. Given certain conditions, a possible equilibrium yields an intermediate level of
investment and a moderate probability of expropriation, so that investment is not completely
swept off. For entrants, the reputational consequences for the government come at the cost of
the rm investing and abandoning at an earlier stage. Thus, the present value for the government
associated with potential entrants is smaller whenever it creates a threat of expropriation.
Figure 2.1 shows themaximumpossible gain, as described in equation 2.47, for the government in
both sectors (panels (a), and (c)) and the compensation offered to the rm, as a proportion of the
fair value, associated with it (panels (b), and (d)). Note that the gain the government obtains from
expropriating one rm is decreasing in the number of rms operating. In the case of essential
businesses, when themarket is large (m is large), the optimal policy is to offer the highest possible
compensation to the rm (V s(x)). This is explained by the fact that operating rms account
for the risk by increasing their abandonment trigger, so the probability that the businesses are
abandoned increases as well. This is costly for the government because it is less efcient than
the private investors, and it has no option but to take on the businesses once they are abandoned.
Thus, the larger ism, the smaller is the governmental gain.
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Figure 2.1: Maximum gain and optimal compensation
(a) Gain - Essential (b) OptimalKv - Essential
(c) Gain - Non Essential (d) OptimalKv - Non Essential
In contrast, for non-essential activities, the government’s optimal policy to maximize its gain is
to conscate the rm when the market is small and to offer a low compensation (below 10% of
the fair value) when the market is large. The difference between both sectors comes from the
abandonment option the government holds in the case of non-essential businesses. Because the
government does not have to operate lossmaking non-essential businesses, its losses in this case
are simply represented by uncollected taxes. Moreover, given that they abandon sub optimally
early, the government may still operate these businesses because xa < xea at the conscation
policy (kv = 0). Additionally, note that the gain is increasing in the number of rms willing to
enter because the earlier investment translates into earlier tax revenues for the government.
Figure 2.2: Maximum welfare
(a) Essential (b) Non Essential
Figure 2.2 presents the maximum welfare gain the government can achieve in the presence of
expropriation risk, that is, the maximum value of the functionWg (equation 2.48). Note that re-
gardless of whether the business is essential for the economy (panel (a)) or not (panel (b)), there is
always a loss that increases with market size. Thus, in terms of welfare, the government should
always offer the highest possible compensation to the target rm to minimize welfare losses.
This is consistent with the results for the benchmark case without expropriation risk and in the
exogenous case: because the government does not have the option to abandon essential busi-
nesses makes it more valuable to have a more efcient agent operating these businesses.
The other key variables the government controls are taxes and royalties, which, by increasing
governmental revenues, have a direct impact on the expropriation trigger and, therefore, on the
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Figure 2.3: Low vs. High Taxes for Non-Essential Activities
(a) Gain, τ = 5% (b) Optimal kv , τ = 5%
(c) Gain, τ = 30% (d) Optimal kv , τ = 30%
level of political risk6. Taxes and royalties have different impacts on the optimal policy of the
government because royalties distort in a more visible way the decisions of the private rm. In
the case of taxes, if the business is not essential (gure 2.3), low taxes induce the government to
conscate the rm, regardless of the size of the market, and high taxes induce the government
to pay a compensation below 25% of the fair value of the rm to maximize its gain. Although
the gain visibly decreases fromwith high taxes, there are still gains from expropriating the target
rm.
If the business is essential (gure 2.4), then low taxes make the government conscate the rm
for small to medium sized markets, and pay a high compensation only when the market is large
enough, where, instead of maximizing a gain, the government has to minimize the loss of ex-
propriation. A higher tax rate, in turn, makes the government offer 100% of the fair value of the
rm as compensation, even for small markets, to maximize its gain from expropriation, which
becomes negative in a context of medium to large markets.
Higher taxes in the presence of political risk delay the exercise of the option to invest and of the
option to abandon 7, which explains why the effect of taxes is so tangible in terms of gains and
losses: the interval in which the government receives scal revenue is larger, and the incentive
to expropriate is smaller. Therefore, when taxes are high, there is more to lose with the threat
to expropriate in both sectors: in order to maximize its gain, the government must offer a high
compensation to the rm even if the market is still small.
Royalties have a more dramatic impact on the optimal policy of the government regarding the
indemnity paid to the target rm. A moderate to high royalty rate is the only case in which
the government is induced to offer the highest possible compensation to the rm to maximize
the gain from expropriation when the business is not essential. This is because the distortion
it creates in terms of incentives of the private rm is more noticeable, in line with the idea that
this distortion leads the rm to abandon operations sub optimally (Bergstrom, 1984). This is also
more visible in terms of welfare: even paying the highest possible compensation to the rm, as
the market grows larger there is dramatic increase of the loss the overall economy experiences.
6We omit l from this analysis because it has a negligible effect, as seen from previous gures.
7The latter is merely an interaction between the expropriation trigger and the abandonment trigger because aban-
donment under normal conditions is neutral to taxes.
28
Chapter 2. Expropriation Risk, Investment Decisions and Economic Sectors
Figure 2.4: Low vs. High Taxes for Essential Activities
(a) Gain, τ = 5% (b) Optimal kv , τ = 5%
(c) Gain, τ = 30% (d) Optimal kv , τ = 30%
2.5 Final remarks
This paper uses a real options model to analyze the irreversible decisions that must be made
by a rm and by a government regarding investment in a new project. The rm must decide
when to undertake the project and when to shut it down, knowing that the government may not
credibly commit to not expropriating once investment costs have been sunk. We consider that
the project may be operating in one of two sectors in the economy, one of which is essential for
the government. This means the government will have to keep essential businesses in operation
once the private investors abandon. If the project is not essential, the government only operates
the business following abandonment of the private investor if it is protable.
This paper answers questions regarding three main issues. First, we analyze what drives the
government to expropriate. We nd that the decision to expropriate is delayed when the rela-
tive efciency of the private rm and the government’s scal income (high royalties and taxes)
increases because the value of the option to expropriate is worth less. In turn, when the cash
ow growth rate and volatility are high, the government is more prone to expropriate. Although
increases in volatility imply a larger value for the government, we observe that if the business
is in the essential sector, the value of the option to expropriate is lower and increases less than
in the case of a non-essential business due to the existence of the possibility to abandon in the
latter.
Second, is the question of how rms react to expropriation? In general, operating in a politically
risky environment accelerates both investment and abandonment. If expropriation occurs later
in expectation, the rmdelays investing and abandoning operations because of the reduced risk.
However, the interaction between the expropriation decision and the abandonment decision is
important to answer this question. There are two cases worth noting. On the one hand, when
cash ow growth is high, even though there is a larger risk of expropriation (lower xe), the rm
waits longer to abandon because the larger cash ows compensate for the expropriation risk
bearing. On the other hand, the scal variables have a different impact on the abandonment
decision. Taxes generate a reduction in the abandonment trigger: a higher tax rate lowers the risk
of expropriation (increases xe), and consequently, the rm waits longer to abandon. We know
that the reduction in xea is the direct consequence of the rm being exposed to less risk because
the abandonment decision in a safe environment is neutral to taxes. Royalties, in turn, distort
the abandonment decision of the rm so that the rm abandons earlier with higher royalties
29
Chapter 2. Expropriation Risk, Investment Decisions and Economic Sectors
despite the smaller expropriation risk it has to bear. The implication is that in the presence of
expropriation risk, the rm will be better off paying more taxes, as long as doing so does not
have a direct impact on the abandonment decision.
Finally, we analyze the costs of expropriation. Instead of assuming only exogenous reputation
or indemnity costs, our construction allows us to study the interaction between both. We can
calculate the costs or benets faced by an opportunistic government when it threatens one rm
with expropriation and determine the loss in terms of welfare that this expropriation threat can
cause. The results of our model show that when the business is essential for the functioning
of the economy, there is a greater welfare gain with a private, more efcient rm operating the
project than in the case where the business is not essential. Therefore, creating a threat to ex-
propriate is also more costly in terms of welfare for essential businesses.
The previous results are in line with results we obtain by endogenizing the reputation costs of
expropriation. For essential activities, the government’s optimal policy to maximize its gain is
generally to expropriate the rm instead of conscating it; it is bound to offer a rather fair com-
pensation, especially if the market is large. However, when the business is not essential, the
government generally maximizes its gain by conscating the rm or paying a low compensa-
tion, whatever the size of the market. In terms of welfare, however, regardless of whether the
business is essential to the economy, the government should always pay the highest possible
compensation to the rm. Because the offered indemnity has a negative relationship with the
probability to expropriate, this implies that expropriation will always be suboptimal in regard to
total value creation in the economy.
2.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Essential The government has no option to abandon this project. Therefore, the constant B4
from equation 2.5 is equal to zero. In addition, recall that B3 = 0 (from equation 2.9). Replacing
these two conditions in equation 2.5 yields the value of the claim for public provision in utilities.
Non-essential The rst value matching condition is given by the fact that if the cash ows are
very large, the government will never abandon the project, so the present value of the project
in such cases is simply the value of the operating facility (eq. 2.50). The second value matching
condition (eq. 2.49) is related to the option to abandon. Having this option makes the constant
B4 positive, which means there is a level of cash ows, xa, in which the government stops oper-
ations and abandons the project with a net salvage value of zero. The abandonment trigger, xa
is determined by the smooth pasting condition (eq. 2.51).
Gc(xa) = 0 (2.49)
lim
x→∞G
c(x) =
x
δ
− cg
r
(2.50)
∂Gc(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xa
= 0 (2.51)
Proof of Proposition 2 In this case, the option value is equivalent for the two sectors, i = u, c.
To obtain a particular solution for equation 2.2, we impose three conditions. The rst is that
B2 = 0 (from eq. 2.4): this ensures that the option value goes to zero for small values of x, where
the option is very out of the money. The second is a value matching condition: it simply states
that at the moment of investment, the option to invest will be worth as much as the operating
project, deducting the investment cost (eq. 2.52). Finally, the smooth pasting condition states
that the level of cash ows at which investment will be carried out is optimally chosen (eq. 2.53).
Gi0(xI) = G
i(xI)− Ig (2.52)
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∂Gi0(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xI
=
∂Gi(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xI
(2.53)
Proof of Proposition 3 The private rm has two value matching conditions. The rst makes
B3 = 0 because, as long as cash ows are high enough (eq. 2.55), the private rm will continue
operations. The second describes the option to abandon: the constant B4 is positive and adds
value to the claim of the private rm. Upon abandonment, at the cash ows level xsa, the project
is worth zero (eq. 2.54). The abandonment trigger is set through the smooth pasting condition
(eq. 2.56).
V s(xsa) = 0 (2.54)
lim
x→∞V
s(x) =
x
δ
(1− ρ)(1− τ)− cv
r
(1− τ) (2.55)
∂V s(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xsa
= 0 (2.56)
The government’s claim is related towhether it has the abandonment option if thermabandons
the project. Therefore, we have one value matching condition for each sector.
Essential The governmenthas to take theproject, disregardingpossible losses. The valuematch-
ing condition 2.57 states that, upon the rm’s abandonment, the claim for the government is the
same as in the case of public provision.
Gus(xsa) = G
u(xsa) (2.57)
Non-essential The government takes the project after the rm’s abandonment if and only if
cv
cg
> (1 − ρ), as this implies that the private rm will abandon earlier than the government
(xsa > xa). Thus, the value matching condition will be equation 2.58. Otherwise, the government
does not take the project after the rm abandons. Thus, its value when the rm abandons is
equal to zero (eq. 2.59).
Gcs(xsa) = G
c(xsa) (2.58)
Gcs(xsa) = 0 (2.59)
Proof of Proposition 4 The private rm has one value matching condition (eq. 2.60), from
which the value of the option at the moment of investment is equal to the value of the project
when cash ows are equal to xsI minus the investment cost. The smooth pasting condition 2.61
allows us to nd the investment trigger of the private rm.
V s0 (x
s
I) = V
s(xsI)− Iv (2.60)
∂V s0 (x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xsI
=
∂V s(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xsI
(2.61)
The government has one value matching condition (eq.2.62) that shows that its claim on the
private rm’s investment option is equal to its claim on the operating project when cash ows
are equal to the investment trigger xsI .
Gis0 (x
s
I) = G
is(xsI) (2.62)
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Proof of Proposition 5 In addition to the option to abandon the project (eq. 2.63), which hap-
pens at the cash ows level xea, the rm has to account for the possibility of being expropriated
and receiving a xed compensation, kv (eq. 2.64). The smooth pasting condition (eq. 2.65) indi-
cates that the abandonment trigger is optimally chosen by the rm, accounting for the possibility
of expropriation.
V e(xea) = 0 (2.63)
V e(xe) = kv (2.64)
∂V e(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xea
= 0 (2.65)
The government also has two valuematching conditions and one smooth pasting condition. The
rst condition (eq. 2.66) is related to the case of abandonment of the private rm and works the
same as in the safe case: depending on the sector, i = u, c, the government has the option to skip
the project’s operation (commodities if xa > xea) or not (utilities). The second determines that the
value of the government’s claim upon expropriation is the value in the public provision case of
Proposition 1 minus the costs of expropriation (eq. 2.67). Finally, the smooth pasting condition
states that the expropriation trigger, xe, is optimally chosen by the government (eq. 2.68).
Gie(xea) = G
i(xea) (2.66)
Gie(xe) = G
i(xe)− kv − kr (2.67)
∂Gie(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xe
=
∂Gi(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xe
(2.68)
Proof of Proposition 6 There are two conditions imposed on equation 2.2 in order to obtain a
particular solution for the option value to the private rm. The value matching condition states
that when the cash ows reach the investment trigger of the rm, xeI , the value of the option
to invest equals the value of the project, accounting for the threat of expropriation, minus the
investment cost (eq. 2.69). The smooth pasting condition (eq.2.70) indicates that xeI is optimally
chosen.
V e0 (x
e
I) = V
e(xeI)− Iv (2.69)
∂V e0 (x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xeI
=
∂V e(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xeI
(2.70)
The government, for either sector, only has one value matching condition (eq.2.71) that shows
that its claim on the private rm’s investment option is equal to its claim on the operating project
at the investment trigger xeI level of cash ows.
Ge0(x
e
I) = G
e(xeI) (2.71)
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Chapter3
Fiscal Incentives, Private Investment
and Expropriation Risk: A Real
Options Approach
3.1 Introduction
In general, a higher level of investment generates more scal revenue, both directly –from cor-
porate taxes- and indirectly –through increased employment and expenses. What is more, if
investment is in the form of FDI –Foreign Direct Investment1– it brings additional benets to
the country, since it is often associated with technology and know-how transfers, as well as de-
velopment of local entrepreneurship; even a positive effect on Human Rights indicators can be
associated with FDI (see Blanton and Blanton (2007)). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that
governments arewilling to takemeasures leading to an increase in investment in their countries.
On the other hand, the main reason why rms are interested in realizing foreign investment
is to seize Ownership, Location and Internalization advantages –the OLI paradigm. Although
these characteristics are purely economical, they can be seriously affected by local conditions,
like political factors. For example, Jensen (2003) argues that political risk has a direct impact
on internalization advantages: when uncertainty is high, the costs of internalizing production
are greatly increased. Countries that lack appropriate conditions –either political or economic,
often offer generous incentives to compensate for those weaknesses2 (Li, 2006). This explains
why some governments may be interested in offering incentives to investment. In fact, Raff
and Srinivasan (1998) nd that tax incentives are especially likely to be observed in countries
with high country risk, among other characteristics. Moreover, according to Janeba (2002), low
credibility may lead countries to offer upfront subsidies because they are not attractive sites to
investors. This is so even though it is generally accepted that incentives are only of secondary
importance to investors, because they rst examine the economy’s fundamentals and then go
on to analyze protability (Rosenboim et al., 2008). Nonetheless, governments have an easier
task offering incentives than addressing changes in those fundamentals (UNCTAD, 2000).
But these incentives may be tricky. According to Engel and Fischer (2010, p.2), compensation is
likely to be observed when prices of the product are low: governments offer specially favorable
conditions to induce rms to invest. However, investors don’t take these special conditions as
credible, since they realize that they will be expropriated –at least through creeping expropria-
1This is the type of investment realized into a company or entity located in a foreign country. Unlike portfolio ows,
which are considered indirect investments, FDI has a more permanent nature.
2Governments may also offer incentives to encourage certain enterprises or categories of enterprises to behave in
a given manner, like being greener, or supporting the growth of a given key sector. However, we only focus on cases
where incentives are offered to compensate for weaknesses in the investment environment.
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tion3. Besides, as Raff and Srinivasan (1998) point out, since one of the main reasons to attract
import-substituting FDI is increased tax revenue, offering tax incentives to attract investment
is contradictory. What really happens is that there’s an informational asymmetry that leads the
government to grant scal incentives in order to signal a positive investment environment.
In this paper we build on the idea that scal incentives are offered as a compensation for some
kind of weakness in the business environment of a host country. Although there is extensive
literature regarding the effects of scal incentives in a ’normal’ environment (e.g. Agliardi and
Agliardi (2008); Agliardi (2001), Panteghini (2004), Pennings (2000), Wong (2011, 2012), Sarkar
(2012), Barbosa et al. (2016)), the study of scal incentives in a context of expropriation risk is in-
cipient. Jensen and Johnston (2011, p. 672) make an exercise in which the leader offers tax breaks
to a multinational corporation operating in a context where the business may be expropriated
by the government. According to their model, (i) lower corporate tax rates are associated with
higher levels of political risk, and (ii) the rm is more willing to invest in a context of expro-
priation risk when there is a tax break. We build on their idea and study the effect of several
scal incentives on the investment decisions of a rm, and the decision of the government to
expropriate the business4.
In particular, we study a rm’s decision to invest in and to liquidate a partially reversible project,
and a government’s decision to expropriate it. We do this through real options analysis, which
borrows the concept of nancial options to value decisions regarding real projects. Thismethod
of analysis offers some advantages over traditional capital investment appraisal techniques, be-
cause real options account for the possibility to delay investment decisions, and to include the
irreversibility of real investments into the valuation process (Décamps et al., 2005; McDonald
and Siegel, 1986). This is specially true if we consider that it is generally not optimal to go by the
rule of undertaking the project the rst time the net present value is positive, due to the value of
information (Sundaresan, 2000). In this sense, real option analysis incorporates a very desirable
characteristic into the valuation process: It allows the rm to value its opportunity to wait until
uncertainty is resolved before it commits to certain actions that are costly to reverse (Damaraju
et al., 2015).
We follow the approach in Restrepo et al. (2015) and consider a sequential investment model, in
which the rm holds two options, (i) to invest in a new project and (ii) to liquidate the business
if it becomes unprotable at operations. The government holds only one option: to expropriate
the operating business. Since the government wants to attract investment, and is aware that it
must compensate the rm for the existence of expropriation risk, it offers one of three scal
incentives to the rm: (i) tax breaks, (ii) lower royalties, and (iii) upfront investment subsidy. The
rm has this information ex-ante, and knows that the government will expropriate the business
at a certain cash-ow level. This means that we have no informational asymmetries and that the
only source of risk of the model comes from the volatility of cash ows.
There are several questions that arise when we analyze scal incentives in a safe political envi-
ronment and in a risky one. First, the rm may be better off with a given type of incentive. We
nd that the answer to this question depends on the riskiness of the environment, the level of
cash inows, and the stage of the business. Second, expropriation risk: with or without incen-
tives? Although the answer to this question also depends on the stage of the business (i.e. invest-
ment or operations), we nd that offering incentives in this case makes the economy worse off,
but this is because the government’s loss is larger than the rm’s gain. In this sense, our model
supports the idea in Jensen and Johnston (2011) that lower taxes are associated with larger levels
of political risk, and that rms may be more willing to invest if taxes are lower. And third, we
want to analyze whether it is more costly for the government to offer scal incentives and then
engaging in political risk, than playing safe without offering incentives. We nd that when there
are neither scal incentives nor expropriation risk, the economy as a whole is better off, while
the government is considerably worse.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2.2 denes the incentives we study. Section 3.2
3Creeping expropriation is a term commonly used to refer to ways of appropriation of prots by the government,
through taxes and other means, without specically taking control of the rm.
4We focus on outright expropriation: the loss of property or control rights over the business. Creeping expropriation
is out of the scope of this paper
34
Chapter 3. Fiscal Incentives, Private Investment and Expropriation Risk
presents the assumptions necessary to construct our model. Section 3.3 develops the model
within a safe political scenario and a politically risky case. Section 3.4 presents a numerical ex-
ample, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Assumptions
3.2.1 Generalities
This economy is comprised by two agents, the government and a private rm. The private rm
wants to invest in a new project, which is its only investment opportunity, and the government
collects taxes if investment is undertaken and the business is operating. This business has the
characteristic of being innitely lived, and requires that the rm pays a one time, non depre-
ciable, investment cost, Iv , to develop it. Although the time span is innite, the business can be
liquidated by its owner if it is no longer protable. In that case, part of the investment cost can
be recovered at liquidation, and the owner can obtain a net salvage value λ < Iv . Therefore, we
say that this business is partially reversible5.
The business has uncertain cash ows, x, that we assume to be represented by a Geometric
Brownian Motion (GBM):
dx = µxdt+ σxdz (3.1)
where µ is the instantaneous growth rate of cash ows, σ their standard deviation, and dz is the
increment of a standard Wiener process. We also assume that µ < r, being r the constant and
known interest rate, so that we are able to obtain nite solutions. We denote the return shortfall,
r − µ, by δ.
There are two stages in our analysis: investment and operations. The private rm decides when
to invest in the new project, based on the operational results of such project. This means that we
rst need to solve for the rm and for the government value at operations to understand when
the rm will undertake investment. At operations, the rm determines a cash ow level that
triggers liquidation, and the government determines the cash ow level that triggers expropria-
tion. The rm makes the decision on investment in the new project using this information. All
the decisions of the rm are made to maximize shareholder value, which is the only objective
of the rm.
The assumption of the cash ows following a GBM determines not only the dynamics for the
rm, but also the government’s behavior regarding expropriation. This allows for establishing
two particular features. First, we assume that the government only expropriates in the good
states of the world. In other words, our government is an opportunistic agent expropriating
only when the business cash-ows are high enough6. And second, expropriation risk follows
a continuous process. Some authors model expropriation as a Poisson distribution (e.g. Clark
(1997)), butwhen the analysis is based on an opportunistic government, itmakes sense to assume
that instead of randomly expropriating, the government observes the evolution of cash ows to
take action when it is more convenient in terms of business value.
We also assume that there are no informational asymmetries for neither of the agents. When
the rm makes the decision on investment, it can completely predict the behavior of the gov-
ernment. On the one hand, it knows that there is a tax scheme that it must comply with, and
that the government commits to such scheme, so that there are no surprises in terms of scal
policy during the life of the business. This also implies that the rm knows ex-ante the type of
incentive that the government will grant. On the other hand, it is well aware that there is a risk
to be expropriated, and knows how the government makes the decision on expropriation.
The government is interested in the rm to invest earlier and abandon later, since this means a
larger stream of scal revenue. Given the risk of expropriation, for the rm to accelerate its in-
vestment or delay the business’s liquidation, it must be compensated in someway. In ourmodel
this compensation comes from offering better conditions in terms of scal variables. Therefore,
5If the net salvage value is zero, then the business is considered irreversible.
6This assumption implies ruling out expropriations that occur out of desperation, as described in Cole and English
(1991).
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the rm is granted one of the scal incentives mentioned below.
3.2.2 Fiscal Incentives
Ascal incentive to investment can be any transfer of funds, reduction in tax payments, etcetera,
that benets a rm, industry or sector. According to González (1996), from the perspective of -
nancial law, incentives from the government canbe categorized into two groups7. The incentives
in the rst group have a direct connection between revenue and public spending. They suppose
a favorable treatment in tributary terms: it is a scal expenditure that is realized as a "no-income".
Jones and Steenblik (2010) refer to them as revenue forgone or not collected. These scal incen-
tives are designed to reduce the tax burden of enterprises.
The other type of incentives in González (1996) is canalized directly from public spending, so
that there is an outlay of public revenue, and it is therefore considered as a public expenditure.
Non nancial incentives belong to this group. Examples of these are dedicated infrastructure
and services, provided only for the purposes of the particular business8 (Jones and Steenblik,
2010; UNCTAD, 2000). Financial incentives, like government grants, and preferential credits,
also belong to this group.
As for the type of incentives that countries offer, it seems that developed countries are prone to
confer incentives related to public spending, like grants and subsidies, while developing coun-
tries prefer to encourage investment by themeans of incentives that reduce scal income (UNC-
TAD, 2000). Since the government is an opportunistic agent trying to compensate for the expro-
priation risk present in the economy, in this paper we assume that the government offers scal
incentives in the rst category of ’no scal income’ in order to compensate the rm. We consider
three incentives:
Lower tax rate The government offers the rm to reduce its corporate tax rate, τ , by an amount
0 < ψ < τ . Given the set-up of the model, this reduction in the corporate tax rate is equivalent
to the government offering an income tax credit, and to a tax refund or tax rebate. With this
incentive, the rm’s investment decision is affected through the results on operations.
Lower royalties rate Several economic activities, such as mining, gas and oil exploitations, and
–in some countries- forestry, require that the rm exploiting natural resources pay a royalty
fee, as these are considered to be sovereign property. Royalties are a special form of tax that is
directly charged on gross income. In this case, the rm observes a reduction in its royalty fee, ρ,
by 0 < φ < ρ.
Investment Tax Credit The government offers a subsidy at the moment investment, that we
call investment tax credit –ITC–: This turns the investment cost of the rm into Iv − Ss. Within
this category, we could t an investment grant (with no contingencies from the part of the gov-
ernment) or tax allowance in which the rm gets to declare part of its capital expenses to reduce
the scal burden the year the investment is made. Note that since this is a one time grant, unlike
the previous cases, there will be no impact whatsoever on the operating results of the rm.
3.3 Setting up the model
This section follows closely the approach in Restrepo et al. (2015). We derive the value equations
for the investment opportunity and for the operating business for all the agents. We start by
dening theOrdinary Differential Equation (ODE) that describes the dynamics of a general claim,
A, which can represent the value of the rm, A = V , or the value of the government, A = G. In
all cases, the subscript 0 denotes the investment opportunity, while the lack of such subscript
7Althoughwemake this distinction here, in ourmodel the direct effect for the government is the same for any type of
incentive: The value it obtains from the business is reduced. This is because we only analyze the government’s valuation
of the business.
8General infrastructure is not categorized as an incentive.
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denotes the claim at operations. We also use the superscript j = ψ, φ, s to represent the cases
we study: tax cut (ψ), reduction in royalties (φ), and ITC (s). The case of no incentives will be free
of superscript. This notation will be maintained throughout the rest of the paper.
3.3.1 The benchmark: A safe political environment
To assess the costs of expropriation risk, we need to establish a benchmark: A safe political envi-
ronment. Using this setting we can observe the effect of scal incentives on the rm’s decisions,
as well as the costs they generate for the government. Notice that having no expropriation risk
implies that the only decision maker in this case is the rm, and the government only observes
and collects taxes.
Value equations for an operating business
The ODE describing the dynamics of the value of an operating business is
0.5σ2x2Axx + µxAx − rA+ Π = 0 (3.2)
where Π = ax − b represents the prot ow accruing to the rm and the government, where x
represent the cash inows of the business, and a and b are described in Table 3.1. For the rm,
the term ajvx−bjv is the after tax prot ow, and for the government, ajgx−bjg is the scal income.
Table 3.1: Cash ows accruing to the government and the rm
Firm Government
ajv b
j
v a
j
g b
j
g
No incentive (1− ρ)(1− τ) cv(1− τ) ρ+ (1− ρ)τ cvτ
Tax cut (1− ρ)(1− (τ − ψ)) cv(1− (τ − ψ)) ρ+ (1− ρ)(τ − ψ) cv(τ − ψ)
Reduction in royalties (1− (ρ− φ))(1− τ) cv(1− τ) (ρ− φ) + (1− (ρ− φ))τ cvτ
ITC (1− ρ)(1− τ) cv(1− τ) ρ+ (1− ρ)τ cvτ
The general solution to ODE (3.2) is given by
A(x) =
a
δ
x− b
r
+B3x
β1 +B4x
β2 , (3.3)
with a and b as dened in Table 3.1, and
β1 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
> 1, (3.4)
β2 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
−
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
< 0, (3.5)
β1 and β2 are the roots to the following characteristic polynomial(
0.5β2σ2 + β
(
µ− 0.5σ2)− r)xβ = 0 (3.6)
Propositions 7, and 8 present the particular solutions to the problem for each claimant in a safe
political environment.
Firm value When the business is in operations, equity holders obtain their post-tax income
and also value the option they hold to liquidate the business when the cash inows reach a low
enough level, xˆj . Proposition 7 shows the dynamics for equity value in our model, V j(x). In
equation 3.7, the rst term accounts for the stream of cash ows after tax. The second term is
the value of the option to liquidate the business, which is obtained by noting that V j(xˆj) = λ,
where λ represents the claim of equity holders upon bankruptcy. The critical value at which
the business is liquidated comes from the smooth pasting condition that ∂V
j(x)
∂x |x=xˆj = 0, which
yields our result for xˆj presented in equation 3.8.
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Proposition 7. Equity value for an operating business
V j(x) =
ajv
δ
x− b
j
v
r
+
(
λ−
(
ajv
δ
xˆj − b
j
v
r
))( x
xˆj
)β2
(3.7)
with ajv and b
j
v as dened in table 3.1, and the abandonment trigger is given by:
xˆj =
β2
β2 − 1
δ
ajv
(
λ+ bjv
)
(3.8)
Proof: See Appendix •
The quotient
(
x
xˆj
)β2 in the abandonment option can be interpreted as the value of one Euro
contingent on future bankruptcy9. Besides, since β2 < 0, the value of the abandonment option
at large cash ow levels will be close to zero, and the value of equity will be approximately equal
to its income and expenses accruals.
Government’s value Nowwe look at the value the government assigns to thebusiness given the
scal income that it generates on operations. We denote the government’s valuation by Gj(x),
which is presented in Proposition 8. There are two main terms in equation 3.9. The rst term is
the scal income stemming from royalties and corporate income taxes. The second term rep-
resents the government’s valuation of the abandonment option, because if the business is liqui-
dated, the government’s value will be Gj(xˆj) = 0.
Proposition 8. Government’s value of an operating business
Gj(x) =
ajg
δ
x− b
j
g
r
−
(
ajg
δ
xˆj − b
j
g
r
)( x
xˆj
)β2
(3.9)
Proof: See Appendix •
Value equations for an investment opportunity
The ODE that describes the dynamics of the investment opportunity is
0.5σ2x2A0xx + µxA0x − rA0 = 0 (3.10)
where the termsA0x andA0xx are therst and secondpartial derivatives of the claimwith respect
to x. Notice that the only difference regarding ODE in eq. 3.2 is that this one reects the fact
that neither of the agents have cash ows accruing before the investment is undertaken (Π = 0),
whichmeans that the returns to this asset are given only by the expected capital gain (Dixit, 1989).
The general solution to this ODE is given by
A0(x) = B1x
β1 +B2x
β2 , (3.11)
and β1 and β2, as dened in equations 3.4 and 3.5, are the roots to the characteristic polynomial
in equation 3.6. The particular solution for each claimant is obtained by imposing certain con-
ditions at the boundaries. Propositions 9, and 10 describe the particular solutions obtained for
the private rm, and for the government, respectively.
Firm value Here we consider the rm’s initial decision to invest in the project. Since the rm
has no other assets, the value of the option is the same as the initial value of the rm. We follow
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) to nd the investment trigger of the rm. In order to do this, we need to
determine the value of the investment opportunity at the moment of investment, which will be
equal to the value of the operating business at the moment in which investment is undertaken,
minus the investment costs. That is, V0(x˜j) = V j(x˜j)−(Iv−Sj), for all j. Equation 3.12 represents
the value of the investment opportunity for a rm that is fully internally nanced. The investment
trigger, x˜j , is the numerical solution of equation 3.13. Such equation comes from the smooth
pasting condition ∂V
j
0 (x)
∂x |x=x˜j = ∂V
j(x)
∂x |x=x˜j .
9This quotient can thus be interpreted as a measure of the probability of bankruptcy (Leland, 1994)
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Proposition 9. Firm’s value of an investment option
Since the project is fully internally nanced, the value of the investment opportunity is:
V j0 (x) =
(
ajv
δ
x˜j − b
j
v
r
+
(
λ−
(
ajv
δ
xˆj − b
j
v
r
))(
x˜j
xˆj
)β2
− (Iv − Sj)
)( x
x˜j
)β1
(3.12)
is the value of the investment option to the rm. The investment trigger, x˜j is the solution to the
implicit equation:
(β1 − 1)a
j
v
δ
x˜j − β1
(
bjv
r
+ Iv − Sj
)
+ (β1 − β2)
(
λ−
(
ajv
δ
xˆj − b
j
v
r
))(
x˜j
xˆj
)β2
= 0 (3.13)
Proof: See Appendix •
The rst and second terms in equation 3.12 represent the after tax prot ow and the value of the
abandonment option at the moment of investment, respectively. The third term represents the
funds required to undertake investment: the (partially) sunk investment cost, Iv , and a subsidy,
Sj (if it applies) that may be granted by the government upon investment. The quotient
(
x
x˜j
)β1
can be seen as the value of one unit of account contingent on future investment.
Government The government values this investment opportunity because if the project is un-
dertaken, it will receive scal income. Equation 3.14 represents its valuation of the option, and its
interpretation is analogous to the case of the rm. It comes from imposing the value matching
condition that Gj0(x˜
j) = Gj(x˜j)− Sj .
Proposition 10. Government’s value of an investment opportunity
Gj0(x) =
(
ajg
δ
x˜j − b
j
g
r
−
(
ajg
δ
xˆj − b
j
g
r
)(
x˜j
xˆj
)β2
− Sj
)( x
x˜j
)β1
(3.14)
Proof: See Appendix •
3.3.2 Business environment with expropriation risk
As we mentioned before, governments that lack the appropriate conditions to attract more in-
vestment are prone to offer incentives to compensate rms. Hence, it would not be surprising
to see governments that cannot rule out expropriation risk offer special incentives to rms. In
our model, as in Restrepo et al. (2015), Schwartz and Trolle (2010), and Clark (1997), the govern-
ment holds an American call option on the private rm: the option to expropriate. As such, the
government maximizes this option’s value. Expropriation will occur when the business cash
ows reach a sufciently high level, εj –the expropriation trigger. Nevertheless, the government
cannotmake its decision independently from the rm’s decisions, since the incorporation of ex-
propriation risk into the rm’s valuation of the business affects directly its liquidation option and
abandonment trigger, xˆj . Thus, there is an interdependency between the rm’s abandonment
trigger and the government’s expropriation trigger, and their relationship should be negative (see
Restrepo et al. (2015)). However, in our context, we have several scal incentives offered by the
government, and each of them affects different elements of the rm’s business prot ow. Their
effect on the interaction of the triggers, business valuation and welfare, is the main question we
try to answer with the model developed below.
Value equations for an operating business
At operations, there are two crucial decisions in this setting, and they are made in the context of
no informational asymmetries: rst, abandonment or liquidation of the private rm, and second,
expropriation of the business by the government. Such decisions are interdependent: the rm
decides on liquidation taking into account the government’s decision to expropriate, and vice
versa. The value equations of the rm will therefore reect how the risk of being expropriated
affects its operational results, knowing the decision rules of the government. If and when the
rm is expropriated, the value of equitywill be V je (ε
j) = kv , where kv ≥ 0 is an indemnity paid by
the government to the rm. And if the cash ows reach the abandonment trigger, x = xˆe
j , equity
value will be equal to its salvage value: V je (xˆe
j) = Λj . Proposition 11 represents this dynamics.
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Proposition 11. Firm’s value of an operating business with expropriation risk
The operating value of equity of a rm that receives incentive j and is exposed to expropriation
risk by the government is given by
V je (x) =
(
ajv
δ
x− b
j
v
r
)
+ Cj1x
β1 + Cj2x
β2 (3.15)
where, ajv and b
j
v are given by Table 3.1, and C
j
1 and C
j
2 are constants given by the value matching
conditions of the rm upon abandonment and expropriation. The abandonment trigger of the
private rm, xˆe
j , is numerically determined by solving the following implicit equation:
ajv
δ
+ β1C
j
1 xˆe
jβ1−1 + β2C
j
2 xˆe
jβ2−1 = 0 (3.16)
Proof: See appendix •
As we have mentioned before, when the government values the business, it takes into account
the rm’s decision to liquidate, given the fact that if cash ows are low (i.e. there is no incen-
tive to expropriate) and the rm abandons, it will lose its scal revenue. This means that the
government’s value upon abandonment of the private rm will be Gje(xˆe
j) = 0.
It also accounts for several other costs at the time of expropriation (i.e. x = εj ): a cost in terms
of efciency, a reputational cost, kr , and an indemnity payment to the rm, kv , which is crucial
for the decision making process of the government, since kv → ∞ ⇒ εj → ∞, xˆej → xˆj (see
Restrepo et al. (2015)). Note that since rms usually get (at most) the fair value of the business,
we set V j(x0) as a natural upper bound for the indemnity payment. We also assume that after
expropriation, the rm has no liabilities left with the government, so that the lower bound is
kv = 0.
Once expropriation takes place, the business is operated by the government. Therefore, the
business’s value will be given by the discounted earnings, the expropriation costs, and the value
of the abandonment option. Like the rm, the government may liquidate the business if cash
inows fall to xˆg , its own abandonment trigger, and obtain the salvage value λ. These dynamics
are presented in Proposition 12.
Proposition 12. Government’s value of a business operated by a private rm, with expropriation
risk
Gje(x) =
(
ajg
δ
x− b
j
g
r
)
+ Cj3x
β1 + Cj4x
β2 (3.17)
in whichCj3 andC
j
4 are constants determined by the valuematching conditions at expropriation
and abandonment, and εj is the expropriation trigger, numerically determined by solving the
following implicit equation:
ajg
δ
+ β1C3ε
jβ1−1 + β2C4εjβ2−1 − ∂G(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=εj
= 0 (3.18)
Where the function G(x), which will be the same for all the cases, j = t, r, s, represents the
dynamics of the value of the business to the government after expropriation has taken place, .
G(x) =
x
δ
− cg
r
− kv − kr +
(
λ− xˆ
g
δ
+
cg
r
)( x
xˆg
)β2
(3.19)
where xˆg represents the abandonment trigger of the government, and it is dened as:
xˆg =
β2
β2 − 1δ
(
λ+
cg
r
)
. (3.20)
Proof: See appendix •
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Value equations for an investment opportunity
As in the benchmark model, both the rm and the government value this investment opportu-
nity based on the results on operations. In this case, they also account for the possibility that the
business will be expropriated when the cash ows reach the level εj . Proposition 13 shows the
value of the investment opportunity (eq. 3.21) and the implicit equation whose solution is the
investment trigger (eq. 3.22).
Proposition 13. Firm’s value of an investment opportunity with expropriation risk
The claim for the private rm is given by:
V j0e(x) =
(
ajv
δ
x− b
j
v
r
+ Cj1 x˜e
jβ1 + Cj2 x˜e
jβ2 − (Iv − Sj)
)(
x
x˜e
j
)β1
(3.21)
Where x˜e
j is the investment trigger that comes from the implicit equation:
(β1 − 1)a
j
v
δ
x˜e
j + β1
(
d
r
− b
j
v
r
− (Iv − Sj))
)
+ (β1 − β2)Cj2 x˜ejβ2 = 0 (3.22)
Proof: See appendix •
Proposition 14. Government’s valuation of an investment opportunity with expropriation risk
The claim for the government on an investment opportunity when it threatens with expropria-
tion:
Gj0e(x) =
(
ajg
δ
x˜e
j − b
j
g
δ
+ Cj3 x˜e
jβ1 + Cj4 x˜e
jβ2 − Sj
)(
x
x˜e
j
)β1
(3.23)
Proof: See appendix •
3.3.3 Cost measures
In order to have a clearer interpretation of results, we borrow fromRestrepo et al. (2015) to estab-
lish somemeasures that allow for a comparison of the incentives. The idea is to use a benchmark
scenario that allows us to collate the results of the government, the rmand the economy in gen-
eral. The measures are intended to provide information about the timing of abandonment and
investment decisions, and about value changes.
The timing of decisions to invest and to disinvest In order to determine whether the rm
accelerates its decision to invest in the project, we measure investment timing as:
Θj0 =
ln(x˜)− ln(x˜j)
ln(x0)− ln(x˜) (3.24)
where x0 is the initial cash ow level, and x˜ represents the investment trigger. We also dene
liquidation timing as:
Θj =
ln(xˆ)− ln(xˆj)
ln(x0)− ln(xˆ) (3.25)
If Θ < 0 it means the critical decision is accelerated when incentives are offered, and if Θ > 0 it
means it is delayed.
Value changes The following measures allow to compare the differences in value once the
scal incentives have been introduced. We dene them in terms of operating results, but they
can also be dened for the investment opportunity using the same logic. In that case, they will
be identied with the subscript 0 (e.g. Γj0).
Change in rm’s value: This measure shows the change in rm’s value when a scal incentive
is introduced.
Hj =
V j(x0)
V (x0)
− 1 (3.26)
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Government’s opportunity cost: By offering scal incentives, the government is giving up scal
income. Γj represents the forgone scal income for each type of incentive offered.
Γj =
Gj(x0)
G(x0)
− 1 (3.27)
Overall value change: While the rm is better off with the incentives, the government is worse
off. With this measure we are able to determine which of the effects weights more in the overall
value creation process. In that sense, we dene Ωj as:
Ωj =
(
V j(x0) +G
j(x0)
)
(V (x0) +G(x0))
− 1 (3.28)
3.4 Numerical Example
In this section we discuss the numerical results we obtain from both the safe case (no political
risk) and the politically risky case. The parameter values for the base case are set as follows: the
initial cash ow level is x0 = 1, the growth rate is µ = 0.01, the volatility σ = 0.25, the interest rate
is r = 0.06, and the costs of the private rm are cv = 0.4 in operations, and Iv = 20 to invest in
the project. The recovery rate of the rm if the business is shut down is λ = 0.20Iv . The policy
variables in this case, are set at τ = 0.15 and ρ = 0.05. In order to determine the different effects
of the risk of expropriation for the three types of incentives, we establish a comparability point
in which all three incentives lead the rm to invest at the same time; that is, x˜ψ = x˜φ = x˜s.
We initially set the reduction in the tax rate as ψ = 0.03, which is around the corporate tax
reductions observed in some countries during 2012, according to the World Bank Group and
PwC (2014)[p.13]. Based on these gures, we then nd the reduction in royalties, and the ITC that
make the rm’s decision to invest indifferent among any of these options.
3.4.1 Politically safe scenario: Which incentive is better and for whom?
Table 3.2 shows the results we obtain for the politically safe scenario. The investment and liq-
uidation triggers in the table are the levels of cash ows at which the rm takes the intended
action: either to invest or to liquidate. For example, the rm’s investment trigger is 3.4897, which
means that once the expected cash ows reach this level, the investment option will be exer-
cised. Note that all three types of incentives yield the same investment trigger, as we set the
exercise to yield this result. In order for the rm to invest at the same time as if the government
offers a reduction in taxes of 3%, the government should reduce royalties in φ = 2.65%, or offer
an ITC of Ss = 3.33%Iv = 0.6660.
Table 3.2 also contains the value accruing to each agent in each of the stages we consider. On
the one hand, V j(x) and Gj(x) represent the value of the business in the phase of operations,
assuming that the cash ows are currently x0 = 1. Remember that this value represents the
discounted ow of prots plus the value of the abandonment option of the rm. On the other
hand, V j0 (x) and G
j
0(x) account for the value of the project before investment is realized (since
we assume that x0 = 1 < x˜j ).
Table 3.2: Private provision in a safe political environment
xˆj V j(x) Gj(x) x˜j V j0 (x) G
j
0(x) Incentive
No incentive 0,3117 11,7885 2,7936 3,5870 3,4120 1,3397
Incentives
Tax cut 0,3073 12,1651 2,4223 3,4897 3,6070 1,1685 0,0300
Lower royalty 0,3033 12,2003 2,3912 3,4897 3,5818 1,1938 0,0265
ITC 0,3117 11,7885 2,7936 3,4897 3,4834 1,2920 0,0333
In order to interpret these results more easily, we resort to the cost measures dened in Sec-
tion 3.3.3 to see what happens in a politically safe scenario once scal incentives are offered to
the rm. Table 3.3 presents the results. First, related with the setting of the exercise, note that
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Θj0 = −2, 153%, for i = φ, ψ, s. This means that the rm accelerates its investment decision com-
pared to the case of no incentives. In contrast, Θj does vary for incentives that affect results on
operations: Θj > 0 for i = φ, ψ, whichmeans that the rmwaits longer to abandon the business.
This is especially true in the case of a reduction in the royalty rate, Θφ = 2, 359%, since they have
a more distortive effect on abandonment decisions than taxes.
Table 3.3: Loss-gain measures for each incentive type
Operations Investment option
Hj Γj Ωj Θj Hj0 Γ
j
0 Ω
j
0 Θ
j
0
Tax cut 3,1946% -13,292% 0,0361% 1,2188% 5,7173% -12,7792% 0,5023% -2,153%
Lower royalty 3,4937% -14,4037% 0,065% 2,3592% 4,9785% -10,8888% 0,5048% -2,153%
ITC 0% 0% 0% 0% 2,0938% -3,5621% 0,4992% -2,153%
If the incentive benets the rms at operations, the conclusion on which incentive is better de-
pends on the stage of the project. According to the results in table 3.2, at operations, the gov-
ernment’s opportunity cost, Γ, the change in rm’s value,H , and the overall value change, Ω, are
higher when the incentive is a reduction in royalties. But when we observe the value of the in-
vestment opportunity, the tax cut is the incentive that improves the most the results of the rm
and the economy (Hψ0 and Ω
ψ
0 are the largest), and worsens the most the government’s situation
(Γψ0 is the smallest). This result is associated with the following phenomenon:
• For low levels of cashows, the rm is better offwith the reduction in royalties, because the
scal savings caused by costs are dominant (a higher tax rate implies a larger term−cvτ/r)
• When cash ows are high enough, then the rm is better off (and the government worse
off) with the reduction in taxes, because the benets of the scal savings are smaller if cash
ows are high.
This result has an implication in terms of the expected behavior of an opportunistic government
that does not fully commit to a tax regime. For a given level of cash ows the government might
switch from one tax system to the other. Particularly, the government may try to encourage
investment through a reduction in royalties for high levels of cash ows, and switch to offer a
tax cut for a low level of cash ows.
As for the government, notice that although it has a positive value in all cases (in table 3.2, G(x),
G0(x) > 0), all the measurements of its opportunity cost (Γj , Γ
j
0) are negative. This is because the
incentives imply a reduction in the scal income. In spite of this, the overall value change (Ωj and
Ωj0) is positive in all the cases, implying that the increase inrm’s valuewith the incentives ismore
signicant than the cost born by the government. Therefore, in this context, scal incentives are
benecial for the economy.
Related with this, we can analyze the dynamics of the government’s value equations when we
vary themain scal variables in ourmodel (τ and ρ). In particular, we observe a Laffer curvewith
both of them. A Laffer curve shows the variation of scal revenue with respect to taxes. Partic-
ularly, it refers to the fact that there are two tax rates, one lower than the other, that will yield
the same scal revenue. The idea behind a Laffer curve is that changes in taxes have two effects
on government’s revenue: The arithmetic effect implies that a decrease in taxes reduces scal
revenue by that amount, and the economic effect recognizes the positive impact that lower tax
rates have on the economy, by the means of work, output, etc. (Laffer, 2004). In our model the
economic effect of taxes is observed through the impact of tax and royalty rates on the aban-
donment decision of the rm. Since the government’s value of the business lies totally on the
tax collections it can obtain, the value equations, Gt, Gr , and Gs can be considered as the value
of scal revenue.
Figure 3.1 presents the evolution of the value equations of the government when we change the
corporate income tax rate (left panel), and when we change the royalty fee (right panel). The
government’s value equations are left skewed, which implies that once the maximum royalty
fee or tax rate is surpassed, the government’s scal income decreases very fast. Note that the
Laffer curve in royalties differs from the Laffer curve in corporate income taxes: the government
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has a bigger scope to increase corporate income taxes before it reaches its maximum value (e.g.
for Gt, ρmax = 0.48, while τmax = 0.71). This result is not surprising, if we consider that royalties,
by taxing gross revenue, are a more distortive scal regime than corporate taxes10.
Figure 3.1: Government value functions
3.4.2 Expropriation risk and political incentives
We continue to use the parameter values set in the previous section as base case scenario, in-
cluding the values of scal incentives found to make the rm’s investment decision in the safe
case indifferent to any of them (ψ = 3%, φ = 2.65%, Ss = 3.33%Iv = 0.6660). And we make two
additional assumptions: (i) the reputation cost is set to kr = 5, and (ii) the indemnity offered by
the government is a xed amount kv = 0.5V (x0). This means that the government commits to
pay half the fair value of a business that doesn’t receive any scal incentives, at the initial cash
ow level x0. The triggers and value functions results are presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Triggers and Value functions: Expropriation risk
xˆe
j εj V je G
j
e x˜e
j V j0e G
j
0e
No incentives 0,4135 2,6101 6,3677 6,5486 3,5692 -2,3008 5,599
Incentives
Tax cut 0,4088 2,5436 6,4442 6,4306 3,4717 -2,4095 5,664
Lower royalty 0,4022 2,5409 6,4874 6,41 3,4724 -2,4137 5,665
ITC 0,4135 2,6101 6,3677 6,5486 3,4714 -2,2287 5,550
In order to interpret these results more easily, we use the costs measures dened in Section
3.3.3, taking two benchmarks. First, we compare our results with the case where there is ex-
propriation risk, but no incentives are offered. Comparing these results with the case where
the government compensates for the risk of expropriation by offering incentives gives an idea
of whether these are actually benecial for an economy with such institutional weakness. Sec-
ond, we use as benchmark the politically safe scenario with no scal incentives, to determine if
investment if the incentives are enough to attract the same level of investment.
Expropriationwith orwithout incentives?
The results are presented in Table 3.5. We start by analyzing the operating business, whose re-
sults only change if φ, ψ > 0. In general terms, we would expect that a smaller expropriation
trigger (more risk) generates a higher abandonment trigger (less scope to bear losses), since this
is how the rm reacts to political risk in our model. This would be the case for a reduction in
royalties (εφ < εψ , εs). However, the private rm is better off when the incentive is a reduction in
10This is why royaltiesmay induce abandonment in (mining) before it is optimal to do so, according to Bergstrom (1984)
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royalties (Hφ > Hψ), which has a direct relationship with the abandonment trigger (Θφ > Θψ).
In turn, the government is worse off (Γφ < Γψ), and so its decision to expropriate is accelerated.
The smaller royalty fee partly offsets the higher expropriation risk generated by the government,
because royalties generate a larger distortion than other taxes in the abandonment decision. This
is consistent with the results in Jensen and Johnston (2011), where rms with a lower tax burden
are more willing to invest, but at the same time, expropriation is more likely to happen.
Table 3.5: Cost measures: Expropriationwith orwithout incentives?
Θj Hj Γj Ωj Θj0 H
j
0 Γ
j
0 Ω
j
0
Tax cut 1,3% 1,2% -1,8% -0,32% -2,18% -4,72% 1,16% -1,32%
Lower royalty 3,13% 1,88% -2,12% -0,15% -2,16% -4,91% 1,16% -1,45%
ITC 0% 0% 0% 0% -2,19% 3,13% -0,88% 0,69%
As for the value of the investment opportunity, we observe that incentives intended for the stage
of operations imply a decrease in the rm’s investment option value (Hφ0 , H
ψ
0 < 0), and are thus
associated with the biggest reduction in investment timing (Θφ0 ,Θ
ψ
0 < Θ
s
0). Notice that the higher
the risk (a lower εj ), the lower the value of the investment opportunity. This induces an acceler-
ation of the decision to invest (see Restrepo et al. (2015)). However, subsidies applied at the mo-
ment of investment, which are not associated with additional discounting due to political risk,
are the ones accelerating themost the decision to invest, and generating an increase in the value
of the investment opportunity. Thus, the smaller investment trigger is solely a consequence of
the incentive offered to the rm.
Related with the results above, note that there is a welfare loss for the case in which the govern-
ment offers incentives that are intended to improve results at the stage of operations (Ωφ0 ,Ω
ψ
0 <
0), associatedwith a larger political risk. Therefore, it seems that if expropriation risk is imminent
and the institutional weakness cannot be corrected, an incentive that does not exacerbate the
threat to expropriate is more convenient for the economy as a whole. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the results of the ITC, where there is an increase in overall value change: the loss in
government’s value generated by a lower scal revenue is smaller than the gain in value for the
private rm.
As for the effect of scal variables, we nd that both royalties and taxes have a positive impact
on the expropriation trigger. When they increase, the larger scal revenue that the government
obtains leads it to postpone expropriation. However, at the same time, the abandonment trigger
increases and the value of the rm at operations decreases. This means that although the rm
bears less risk, the reduction in the post-tax income offsets the effect that lower expropriation
risk has in the rm’s results. The government value function follows a similar dynamics as in the
benchmark case, so we also observe a Laffer curve for royalties and for taxes. Figures 3.2 and 3.3
show the evolution of the value functions of the government11. There are several points to notice
in the graphs:
• The royalty rate and the tax rate thatmaximize government’s value for all types of incentives
is considerably smaller than in the case of no risk. For example, themaximum government
value is reachedwhen royalties are shortly below 40%, when in the safe case this happened
when royalties were about 60%.
• With high kv , the government can increase taxes and royalties somewhat further before it
reaches themaximum rate. This means that even if the government is worse at expropria-
tion by having to pay a higher compensation to the rm, the results at operations are good
enough to offset this loss at expropriation.
• Themore evident curvature of government’s valuewhen taxes (τ ) change indicates that the
marginal scal revenue is higher for every 1% increase in the corporate tax rate.
11Initially, we assume that the government offers to pay an indemnity kv = 0.5V (x0) to the rm in case of expro-
priation. This implies that the indemnity value varies with taxes and royalties. Therefore, in order to assure that the
dynamics of this exercise is only picking up the effect of taxes and royalties, we set the indemnity payment to a xed
value. Medium-low refers to kv = 5, which is around 40% of the value of the rm in the safe case, and medium-high
refers to kv = 9, close to 80% of V (x0).
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Figure 3.2: Varying royalties and taxes, medium-low kv
Figure 3.3: Varying royalties and taxes, medium-high kv
Safe vs. Risky: Which incentive is better?
Table 3.6 shows the results for the second set of comparisons. Both ex ante and ex post, the
rm is worse when there is expropriation risk (Hj > 0). In turn, the government is better off
(Γj > 0) due to the value of the expropriation option, which enhances its claim on the business.
The combined result, however, is a reduction in overall value (Ωj < 0): the large increase in
government value is not enough to offset the negative results obtained by the rm, and so the
economy is worse off. Also notice that the order of results observed in the previous section also
holds in this case: the rm is better off with the ITC at the investment stage, and this is related
with the smallest welfare loss for the economy.
Table 3.6: Cost measures: Safe without incentives vs. Expropriation with incentives
Θj Hj Γj Ωj Θj0 H
j
0 Γ
j
0 Ω
j
0
Tax cut -23.25% -45.33% 130.19% -11.71% -2.56% -170.62% 322.81% -31.5%
Lower royalty -21.86% -44.97% 129.45% -11.55% -2.54% -170.74% 322.82% -31.59%
ITC -24.23% -45.98% 134.41% -11.42% -2.56% -165.32% 314.28% -30.1%
The implication of this result is that the rst best for the economy would be a sound political
environment, since the rm is not even close to being fully compensated by the scal mecha-
nisms offered by the government in a context of expropriation risk. However, reaching a strong
institutional environment is a lengthy and costly process. Therefore, to attract investment in the
midst of such process, governments could offer scal incentives that do not exacerbate political
risk –like lower taxes that suggest a large and unfair multinational take–.
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3.5 Final remarks
It has been documented that countries with a sound institutional environment are more suc-
cessful at this task than their counterparts offering less stable conditions. However, strengthen-
ing the institutional environment of a country is a task that may be very costly for a government,
in terms of time and effort. Offering scal incentives to rms in order to compensate for a weak
institutional and business environment is a strategy that offers more facilities to governments in
their attempt to attract investment. The main goal of this paper is to analyze whether providing
investment incentives to the rm in a context of expropriation risk is benecial for the rm, for
the government, and for the economy as a whole. In order to do that, we build a real options
model that studies the decisionsmade by a private rm regarding the investment and liquidation
decisions of a partially irreversible business, in a context in which an opportunistic government
has the option to expropriate it. The decision to invest is contingent on the developments on
operations, where the liquidation decision of the rm interacts with the expropriation decision
of the government.
The purpose of this model is to answer threemain questions. The rst question asks which type
of incentive is more benecial for the rm. We nd that in a politically safe environment the
reduction in royalties provides the best results at operations for the rm. This is so because they
have a more distortive nature than other taxes -like corporate income tax. Moreover, this result
holds when we include risk: we nd that the rm is more willing to take losses (abandonment
is delayed), even though this type of incentive makes the government more prone to expropria-
tion. However, if governments want to achieve an even earlier investment of the rm, then they
should go for an incentive that does not imply higher political risk. The results of ITC prove so.
The second question asks whether offering incentives generates any improvements if expropri-
ation risk is granted. That is, we want to establish if there is any improvement from a state in
which there is expropriation risk and there are no benets offered, to another one where the
government compensates the rm for its threat to expropriate. The results show that the gov-
ernment loses value when the incentives offered impact only the investment decision of the
rm, but the rm is better off, in such a way that the whole economy is better off. If the incen-
tives are intended to affect the operational results of the rm, the rm’s results improve, but the
government’s results deteriorate. When combined, the fall in government’s value dominates the
effect and there is a welfare loss.
Finally, the third question compares the outcomes when the government offers a safe institu-
tional environment and no incentives to investment vs when there is an expropriation risk and
rms are compensated for it. We nd that although the government’s value is always higher
when there is expropriation risk, for the economy in general compensating the rm for a po-
litically risky environment is never as good as creating a safe political environment: rms know
that they will be expropriated sooner or later, and this will lead them to have a smaller scope to
bear losses, which in this model is channeled through an early abandonment of the business.
Thus, if governments aim at effectively attractingmore investment, they should provide a sound
institutional environment. Nevertheless, since achieving such state is a lengthy process, offering
incentives that do not worsen political risk in the meantime could be the best option.
3.6 Appendix
Safe political environment
This section explains the conditions imposed on the general solution of ODE 3.3. These proofs
are related to propositions 7, and 8. In this case, all the claims depart from the same principles.
First, for the private rm and the government it must be that
lim
x→∞ =
a
δ
x− b
r
(3.29)
This condition ensures that the value of the business does not go to innity as x becomes suf-
ciently large, so that B3 for A = V,G. Second, at the moment of abandonment of the private
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rm, we have that, (i) for the private rm:
V j(xˆj) = λ (3.30)
where, λ is the residual value if the rm liquidates the business. (ii) for the government:
Gj(xˆj) = 0 (3.31)
because if the private rm abandons, the government loses all its scal income.
The smoothpasting condition in this case is for theprivate rm, and from itwe candetermine the
abandonment trigger in equation 3.8. This smooth pasting condition requires that the functions
are matched not only in values but also in their slope, in particular,
∂V (x)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=xˆj
= 0 (3.32)
Expropriation risk
In this case, the conditions imposed are at the moment of abandonment and expropriation for
all agents A = V,D,G.
Private rm At the moment of abandonment, the rm will get the liquidation value (λ):
V je (xˆe
j) = λ (3.33)
If it is expropriated, the rm receives a compensation kv from the government
V je (ε
j) = kv (3.34)
Finally, the smooth pasting condition that allows for nding the abandonment trigger xˆe
j in
equation 3.16 is:
∂Eje(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xˆej
= 0 (3.35)
Government If the private rm abandons the business (and the cash ows never reached the
expropriation trigger, εj , the government’s claim on the business is zero, because it loses all scal
income.
Gje(xˆe
j) = 0 (3.36)
At themoment of expropriation, the government’s value should be equal towhat it starts earning
from the business, minus its reputation and indemnity costs:
Gje(ε
j) =
εj
δ
− cg
r
− kv − kr +
(
L− xˆ
g
δ
+
cg
r
)(
εj
xˆg
)β2
(3.37)
The smooth pasting condition fromwhich the expropriation trigger, εj , is obtained, ensures that
at the moment of expropriation not only the values but also the derivatives of the functions are
the same. This condition is given by:
∂Gje(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=εj
=
1
δ
+ β2
(
λ− xˆ
g
δ
+
cg
r
)(
εj
xˆg
)β2 ( 1
εj
)
(3.38)
After expropriationhas occurred, the government owns thebusiness, and it can liquidate itwhen
it is no longer protable (x = xˆg), receiving the residual value of the business, λ.
Gje(xˆe
j) = 0 (3.39)
The abandonment trigger of the government comes from solving the smooth pasting condition
1
δ
+ β2
(
λ− xˆ
g
δ
+
cg
r
)(
1
xˆg
)
= 0 (3.40)
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Derivation of the value of the investment opportunity
Theprivaterm Theparticular solution to the value of the investment opportunities presented
in Propositions 9 and 13 comes from imposing certain boundary conditions. In particular, if there
is no prospect of prot in the future, then the asset’s worth will be zero. Therefore, V (0) = 0.
Since β2 < 0, to ensure that the value of the funci liketion goes to zero as x goes to zero, we set
B2 = 0. The constant B1 arises from the fact that the value of the investment option must be
equal ro the net value obtained by exercising it, i.e. V0(x˜) = V (x˜) − I , where I = Iv − Sj , and
Sj = 0 for j 6= s. Finally, the investment trigger is obtained through a smooth pasting condition
that ensures that the functions of V0(x) and V (x)− I should meet tangentially at x˜:
∂V j0 (x)
∂x
|x=x˜j = ∂V
j(x)
∂x
|x=x˜j (3.41)
Government In order to obtain the value equations for the government in propositions 10 and
14, we also impose the condition that B2 = 0 to ensure G(0) = 0. The value of the constant B1 is
obtained by noticing that at the moment of investment, it should be that G0(x˜) = G(x˜)− Sj .
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The Impact of Expropriations on the
Stock Prices of the Parent Companies:
Sell on the rumor, buy on the news?
4.1 Introduction
We evaluate the economic impact of government expropriation of private property on the stock
prices of the parent company. As far aswe know, this article is themost thoroughgoing empirical
research to date on this subject. Previous literature has focused on either one economic sector,
like Shcherbakova (2010), who studies seven energy nationalization processes, or one country,
as the analysis of equity transfers in China by Gao and Kling (2008).
Wedene an expropriation as the seizing, by the sovereign, of privately owned tangible property,
with a view towards its continued operation (Truitt, 1970); in that sense, it is an act of a rm’s
involuntary divestment 1. Still, expropriations are not illegal per se2. In fact, many countries have
laws allowing the government the right to expropriate private property to address public issues,
such as development or environmental matters. Therefore, as Sloane and Reisman (2004) point
out, the "practice of eminent domain" is not likely to disappear. Evenmore, resource nationalism
in the last decade has generated an increase in the number of expropriations occurring all over
the world3.
Although news on expropriation-related events are likely to generate a market reaction with re-
spect to the stock prices of both parent and subsidiary companies, there is a lack of empirical
evidence on this subject in extant literature. Our paper aims to ll this gap. We dene two broad
types of events. We distinguish between warnings and forced divestments. What we call pre-
expropriation warnings relates to references to expropriation or nationalization publicly made
by the government, but do not imply the denite loss of property or control rights over the pro-
duction unit. These can be: (i) Announcements of nationalization, (ii) Announcements of expro-
priation, (iii) Occupations, (iv) Threats, and (v) Transitory permit revocations. Thereupon, warn-
ingsmay be followed by several government actions. These arewhat we call forced divestments.
We consider three types of government actions: (i) Outright expropriation, (ii) Forced sale and
(iii) Permanent rescission of permit or concession. Our basic hypothesis is that expropriation-
related events are bad news for future performance of parent companies and therefore their
market value will decrease when these events are known. Wemake one exception in the case of
1Kobrin (1980) uses the term ’forced divestment’ in order to group the different types of governments’ seizing. In this
section, we use the term expropriation to refer to any act of involuntary divestments indistinctly.
2According to Sloane and Reisman (2004), there seems to be a consensus in tribunals in that governmental conduct
is determinant to dene state responsibility in an expropriation action.
3It is worth noting that we do not study ’creeping’ expropriation, which involves governments’ increasing their take
through taxes or other mechanisms, as these acts do not imply the loss of property or control rights of the rm.
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forced sales, where we expect the market to have a positive reaction, due mainly to a correction
of parent rms’ valuation.
The event study methodology comes as a handy tool for this paper by providing a measure of
stockholders’ wealth change in the light of a given unanticipated event; see Brown and Warner
(1980). In that fashion, if expropriation related announcements are to some extent unexpected,
one should observe an abnormal market reaction. Whether this reaction anticipates the event,
occurs during, or after the event, depends on the level of informational efciency of themarkets.
Specically, we investigate the short-term impact of events related to government expropria-
tion of private property on the stock prices of the publicly listed parent company by means of a
unique database of 116 events in 12 countries from 2005 to 2013. Although our results should be
read with caution given our small sample sizes for the individual event types, we nd signicant
negative effects associated with several kinds of warnings; the larger effect is when the warning
takes the form of a transitory revocation of a permit. In the case of forced divestments, we nd
a signicant negative impact when there is a permanent revocation of a permit. However, stock
prices react positively to forced sales. Thus empirical evidence supports our basic hypotheses
in almost all cases.
Although it is not uncommon to nd event studies relating stock market reactions to political
events (e.g. Dube et al. (2011), Luechinger and Moser (2014)) there is relatively scarce literature
on the effect of expropriations. Shcherbakova (2010) carries out an event study on the mar-
ket impact of eight high prole regulatory events in the energy sector: nationalization and de-
nationalization decrees. These events affect rms operating in Russia, Venezuela and Bolivia.
Her results show that negative events (nationalizations) generate abnormally low returns, while
the one positive event in her sample generates abnormally high returns. However, there are
some problems in the denition of at least one event4, and she centers the estimation window
for normal returns on the expropriation event date. This decision is problematic because it rules
out the possible impact of information leakages or previous announcements. Besides that, the
event would affect not only the abnormal returns, but also the normal returns (MacKinlay, 1997).
Gao and Kling (2008) analyze the market reactions to equity transfers in China. They categorize
equity transfers into four categories, including privatization and nationalizations, understanding
these as the stock transfer from the State to a legal person or vice versa. They nd that while pri-
vatizations have positive effects on returns of the privatized rm, the stockmarket perceives na-
tionalizations as a bad signal for future stock performance. Nevertheless, since they only analyze
the announcement of stock transfers, it is not possible to know whether these nationalizations
occurred as a forced divestment or as a voluntary action executed by the rm.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we dene the type of events that we study,
and hypothesize about their effect on the parent rm’s stock price. We describe the event study
methodology in Section 4.3 and set up the framework for the selection of events and data in Sec-
tion 4.4. Empirical results and robustness are presented in Section 4.5, while Section 4.6 shows
possible variables explaining the cumulative abnormal returns. Section 4.7 concludes the paper.
4.2 Denition of events: warnings and forced divestments
In this section, we dene all the events considered in the paper and hypothesize about their
likely effects on the stock prices of parent rms. We start by stating the obvious: The expected
effect of expropriations on the value of the parent rm is negative. This happens because in
many occasions, governments may not compensate the parent rm, and even if they do, such
indemnity may be below fair value. Besides, although it is true that parent rmsmay start a legal
arbitration in international courts against the expropriator governments, it is also true that: (i)
these processes are far from being inexpensive, and (ii) the governments, as sovereign entities,
may choose not to indemnify the demanding rm, even if the court rules so.
However, there may be many governmental actions related to an expropriation. In this paper,
we separate the expropriation-related events into two categories (i) pre-expropriationwarnings,
4For example, in the case of the second oil nationalization in Venezuela, there is an additional phase for rms to
conclude the forced sale to PDVSA. Shcherbakova (2010) did not consider this stage.
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and (ii) forced divestments5. What we call pre-expropriation warnings relates to references to
expropriation or nationalization publicly made by the government, but do not imply the de-
nite loss of property or control rights over the production unit. Thereupon, warnings may be
followed by several government actions. For example, after an expropriation threat, the rm’s
assets may be seized later on. We name the actions leading to the effective loss of rights over
the business as forced divestments. By differentiating between these two broad categories, it is
possible to determine the extent to which the market considers the warnings as credible signals
andwhether they can be useful to anticipate the forced divestments. Below, we dene each type
of action and discuss its expected effects.
4.2.1 Pre-expropriation warnings
In general, we expect pre-expropriation warnings to have a negative impact on the value of the
parent rm, even if the warning does not imply the immediate loss of its property/control rights
over the facility. The reason for this is that warnings can be interpreted either as credible signals
of future expropriation, or as a way to put pressure on the rm to increase government’s inu-
ence. We describe the ve types of warnings below, as well as their possible effect on the parent
rms’ stock returns.
Announcements of nationalizations
Thesemay refer to: (i) The government pursuing a broad policy within a given industry or sector,
affectingmore than one rm6, (ii) The government announces its intention of taking over a given
rm and establishes a deadline to negotiate its fair value.
The effect of this type of event on stock prices of the parent company is far from clear. On the
one hand, in the end, the announcement may not materialize. On the other hand, if it does
materialize, a nationalization process may end up as an outright expropriation if both parties
are not able to come to an agreement, or as the complete opposite: a satisfactory negotiation
process for both parties. Overall, the uncertainty about the outcome of the announcement (no
action, negotiation, expropriation) makes it difcult to ascertain the denite result. Therefore,
an attitude of ’wait and see’ may be a reasonable market response.
Hypothesis 1a. Announcements of nationalizations do not have clear effects on the stock price
of parent rms
Announcements of expropriations
In these cases, the government addresses its action towards a particular rm, or set of rms,
without a nationalization decree backing up the decision, or simply commanding the forceful
possession of the rm’s assets. Expropriations are unilateral decisionsmade by the government,
and compensation for the expropriated assets may seem an unlikely outcome. If the stock mar-
ket considers these announcements as credible, its reaction towards the parent’s company value
is likely to be negative.
Hypothesis 1b. Announcements of expropriations affect negatively the stock price of parent
rms.
Occupations
Occupations refer to events inwhich the government orders the intervention of the plants with-
out previous notice. Since an occupation can be temporary (common in Venezuela), unless it
comes with an explicit announcement of assets to be seized, an occupation is not considered
an expropriation7. These may have a negative impact on the parent rm’s stock returns for two
5We borrow this term from Kobrin (1980), in order to avoid confusion between outright expropriation and national-
ization.
6For a brief illustration of the phases of a nationalization process, see Figure 4.5 in the Appendix 4.8.
7Whenever the announcements of occupation and expropriation coincided, the event was taken as an outright ex-
propriation.
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reasons. First, investors may interpret it as the clear intention by the government to seize the
business. Second, it shows an unfriendly relationship between the government and the rm, at
least from the sovereign side.
Hypothesis 1c. Occupations have a negative effect on the parent rm’s stock return.
Threats to expropriate or nationalize
The government threatens publiclywith either nationalization or expropriation. This threatmay,
ormay not, be fullled afterwards. Threats should generate negative stock returns for the parent
rms aswell. If the threat is to expropriate, then it signals that the rm is under the government’s
watch. If the threat is to nationalize, it may not be as worrisome to investors, but it still predicts
that the rm will operate under worse terms –that is, if it reaches an agreement with the gov-
ernment.
Hypothesis 1d. Threats have a negative impact on the stock returns of the parent rms.
Transitory revocation of permit
Either the permits necessary to operate a certain project are temporarily suspended or the gov-
ernment puts the renewal of the concession on standby. This action violates a previous renewal
agreement. However, at this stage, the government has not made any resolution regarding the
rm’s assets.
This type of announcement implies a cease of activities for the subsidiary or project, and it is
likely to generate a negative effect on the stock price of the parent rm due to: (i) a disruption
of operating income, and (ii) the government signaling a desire either to increase its take, or to
expropriate the rm/project (perhaps to sell it to a higher bidder). This effect may be especially
large for some rms in the sample, which have a large dependence on the concessions being
revoked.
Hypothesis 1e. Transitory revocations of permits have a negative effect on the parent rm’s stock
returns.
4.2.2 Forced divestments
Keeping inmind that expropriations are sovereign actions that parent companiesmay challenge
on the courts, but without a guaranteed success, they are ’catastrophic’ events8 for parent rms.
However, not all expropriation-related actions have the same degree of severity, so the stock
market’s reaction will likely differ from one type of action to another.
Forced sales
Forced sales usually involve an agreement between the rm and the government. Typically, a
forced sale is the result of a negotiation process with the sovereign, in which a State Owned
Enterprise (SOE) buys the privates’ assets and pays a stipulated compensation. In this sense,
we may interpret these actions as a not-so regular asset sale9 by the parent company to the
government. In general, voluntary asset sales are associated with positive mean excess equity
returns on the day of the announcement (Clayton and Reisel, 2013). However, given the special
characteristics of the deal, a forced sale might have two counteracting effects –one positive, and
one negative. We argue that the combined impact of these two effects is likely to be positive.
The negative effect is associated with an adverse market reaction: The transfer of assets may be
set below fair value, so that the market punishes such unfair sale.
8We use this term based on the denition of catastrophe risk provided by Banks (2005): man-made or natural events
that occur with low frequency and may result in substantial economic damage.
9In our sample, we deal mostly with asset purchases by the government, since many of the nationalized entities are
projects or small rms directly controlled by a multinational, parent rm. If this were not the case, we should consider
a different kind of acquisition.
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The positive effect may be explained by two mechanisms. On the one hand, the government
announces nationalizations with anticipation, and the process’s results are uncertain. This un-
certainty is likely to generate volatility in the relevant stockmarket before the governmentmakes
its decision to nationalize. In view of that, by the time of nationalization, the fact that such uncer-
tainty is resolvedmay result in a positivemarket reaction –kind of a rebound effect-, especially if
we consider that themarket may have incorporated the possible expropriation into its valuation
during the nationalization process. What is more, a nationalization implies that (i) there is a pur-
chase –and not an asset seizure- made by the government, and (ii) since the rm’s relationship
with the government is still ’amicable’, it lets the door open to new investment possibilities in the
country10.
Hypothesis 2a. Forced sales have a positive effect on the parent rm’s value.
Outright expropriations
Outright expropriations differ in substance from forced sales. An outright expropriation is the
forceful possession of the rm’s assets by the government. Compensation may be sought by
the rm, through lobby or litigation, or may be granted by the government in rather exceptional
cases. However, there is no agreement regarding the asset transfer between the rm and the
government before the expropriation. We categorize two types of events as outright expropria-
tion:
(i) When a forced sale does not come to good terms, and the two parties do not reach an
agreement.
(ii) Seizure of the rm’s assets.
These events are the most catastrophic ones within our study, since they imply a total loss of
property rights by the rm, inmost cases without a fair compensation. Therefore, we expect the
stock price of parent rms to experience a signicant decline.
Hypothesis 2b. Outright expropriations have a negative impact on the value of the parent rm.
Permanent revocation of permits
These events happen in situations inwhich thermhadobtained a license to operate a facility for
a specic time period, but the property rights over the facility have always belonged to the state
(e.g. mining concessions). We refer to a permanent revocation of permits when the government
sets a deadline to return the facility to the sovereign, violating a previous renewal agreement.
We expect the stock market to react negatively towards these events. Although their effect may
be similar to an outright expropriation, there is an important difference between both types of
events: while outright expropriations refer to property rights, revoked concessions usually affect
only control rights.
Hypothesis 2c. Permanent revocations have a negative impact on the value of the parent rm.
4.3 Event study set-up
In order to determine whether the stock price has an abnormal reaction to pre-expropriation
warnings and forced divestments, we use the traditional event-study methodology, which esti-
mates abnormal returns as out-of-sample predictions (see Brown andWarner (1980, 1985)). Fig-
ure 4.1 depicts the time-line of a traditional event study. The The rst step is to specify themodel
generating normal or predicted returns: the returns an investor would expect to realize had the
event not occurred (see Campbell et al. (1997), Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), and Kothari and
10As implausible as this may sound, there are cases of rms investing again in the host country, even if it had assets
nationalized by the same ruling government. For instance, France’s Total and Spain’s Repsol, subject toOil nationalization
decrees in Venezuela, still operate in the country through new investments.
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Warner (2007)). This benchmark is to be estimated within a period prior to the event –the esti-
mation window-, excluding the event itself to provide estimators that are free of the influence of
the event’s effects. The estimationwindowshould be long enough to capture thenormal returns.
Using the notation in Figure 4.1, the estimation window in our model is [T0, T1] = [−245,−6].
Figure 4.1: Time line for an event study
There are several types of statistical models generating normal returns, like the constant mean
return model, and the market adjusted return model (see MacKinlay (1997)). In this paper, we
use the market model (eq. 4.1), which assumes the expected return of the security to vary both
over time and across securities. It expresses the return on every security as a systematic risk
component, which is a proportionβi of themarket return11, rm,t, plus a residualui,t that is specific
to the firm, and uncorrelated to the market12 (Rosenberg, 1981).
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + ui,t (4.1)
After estimating normal returns, the abnormal performance of a stock is measured as the dif-
ference between ex-post and predicted returns during the event window; that is, we compute
the error term as follows (out-of-sample basis):
ARi,t = ui,t = ri,t − rˆi,t (4.2)
then, CARs –cumulative abnormal returns- are calculated to account for the possibility that the
event’s effects develop over time. Therefore, we accumulate abnormal returns over the event
window, τ = [τ1, τ2], where T1 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T2
CARi,τ =
τ2∑
t=τ1
ARi,t (4.3)
At this point, there are two important issues to address. First, the event window length is a cen-
tral question when setting up an event study, but despite its importance for the analysis, there is
no general agreement among researchers on its proper length. MacKinlay (1997) suggests using
[−1,+1], but other windows are common. For example, Dube et al. (2011) use [0, 15], Luechinger
and Moser (2014) use [0, 1], and Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) use [−5,+5]. As a baseline specifica-
tion,weconsider fivedaysbefore the announcement andfivedays after the announcement –that
is, the conservative [−5,+5] interval13- because such specification allows for exploring whether
the market is able to anticipate the events (by including in the analysis some days prior to the
event) or if the market needs a few days to reflect the impact of the news on the market prices14
(by including in the analysis some days after the event).
Second, using conventional inference methods in event studies poses a problem because stock
prices are not normally distributed, and returns may be subject to cross sectional correlation
(see Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), and Campbell et al. (1997)). This has led to the use of non-
parametric tests, usually more powerful than their parametric counterparts in these cases. In
11Park (2004) suggests including exchange rates in eq. 4.1 for international event studies. Shcherbakova (2010) includes
the oil price in eq. 4.1 to conduct her event study on oil firms. We do not include any additional variables, but we refine
this specification using a sectoral index in order to control for sector-specific dynamics.
12We assume that E[ui,t] = 0, since the unexpected returns in an efficient market cannot systematically differ from
zero, and that var[ui,t] = σ2i,t.
13Wider windows increase the probability of confounding events entering into the computation of CARs, which may
generate a bias in the results. We exclude events from our sample that are subject to confounding events during the
11-day window, centered on the event day.
14The speed of the reaction of the market depends on the relative impact of the frictions to trade (liquidity, transaction
costs, limits on short positions and so on), as well as the time the news on the event take to arrive in the home market.
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order to establish the signicance of cumulative abnormal returns, we use the Generalized Rank
Test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), which distributes asymptotically as a Student’s t,
with T − 2 degrees of freedom. The authors have shown this test to be robust to return serial
correlation, event-induced volatility, and cross-sectional correlation resulting from clustering.
However, because we deal with very small samples for some event types, we also calculate the
test’s exact distribution, building on the idea that percentile ranks distribute as uniform random
variables over the interval [0, 1] (Corrado and Zivney (1992), Dube et al. (2011)).
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Events
In order to dene the events we study, we follow the approach proposed by Kobrin (1980, 1984).
The author constructs the most comprehensive database of forced divestments acts to 1980 in
order to analyze their determinants, accounting for political, legal, nancial and economic fac-
tors15. Even though the aims and scope of our paper differ from those of Kobrin (1980), his frame-
work to dene an act of involuntary divestment is our starting point to dene the events that we
study16.
In that sense, the rst step to look for events of forced divestment is to determine the char-
acteristics that dene such an action. An event enters our sample if it has the three following
characteristics. First, the divestment is involuntary and forced by the host government. Since
our main purpose is to understand how rms react to political risk -particularly, expropriation
risk-, which concerns the protection of property rights in the host country, we exclude rms
that have been nationalized as part of any bail-out program. For instance, our sample does not
include banks and nancial rms nationalized because of the recent Global Financial Crisis. Sec-
ond, the forced divestment directly affects the property or control rights, and not the benets
associated with operations. Therefore, we exclude ’creeping expropriation’ from our sample.
This means that the event of renegotiation of contracts only enters the database when it im-
plies a threat to the rm’s operations. Finally, the targeted property is privately owned by either
national or foreign agents.
However, as explained in Section 3, we also analyze announcements or transitory actions asso-
ciated with factual forced divestments. That is, we consider announcements, threats, temporary
occupations and transitory permit revocations when they signal the government’s intention to
force a rm’s divestment.
We obtained the events in our sample through an extensive news search mainly through Abi-
Inform, which is a database that contains key business publications, with a large international
coverage. However, in some cases it was necessary to complete the information with additional
sources, such as rms’ press releases, and local newspapers. Our baseline data, presented in Ta-
ble 4.1, includes 116 events, involving 70 publicly traded rms whose operations resulted threat-
ened and/or affected in 12 countries between 2005 and 2013. Venezuela and Bolivia account for
the majority of cases, with 54.3% and 13.8% of the total number of events17.
Table 4.2 presents the results in terms of industry sectors for the total sample, pre-expropriation
warnings and forced divestments. Although our results are not directly comparable to other
studies on expropriations (e.g. Kobrin (1980), Minor (1994) and Hajzler (2012)), the gures ob-
tained for the group of forced divestments offer some insight on the evolution of the industries
that have been historically affected by expropriation-related actions. In our sample, between
2005 and 2013, more than 50% of the events are related to mining and oil services (ICB codes
15His work was extended by Minor (1994) and Hajzler (2012).
16However, there are two differences between Kobrin’s denitions and ours: (i) he accounts for cases in which non-
governmental agents force divestments, but we consider governmental agents only, and (ii) an event enters his sample
only if it regards targeted foreign property, but we consider also local property.
17Our baseline data includes only 116 events because we excluded rms affected by confounding effects: events un-
related to those in our sample that may affect the parent rm’s stock price and bias our results (see McWilliams and
Siegel (1997), MacKinlay (1997)). Appendix 4.8 presents a frequency table of events by type that accounts for all the events
affected listed rms that we found while conducting this research.
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Table 4.1: Events by type
Event type Frequency Proportion of the Total
Announcement of nationalization 37 31.9
Announcement of expropriation 1 0.86
Occupation 11 9.48
Threat 22 18.97
Revocation of permit 6 5.17
Pre-ExpropriationWarnings 77 66.38
Outright expropriation 21 18.1
Forced sale 14 12.07
Permanent Rescission of Contract 4 3.45
Forced divestment 39 33.62
Total sample 116 100.00%
0001 and 1000) while the average of acts18 affecting rms in these sectors between 1960 and
2006 is close to 30%. Forced divestments of rms associated with utilities account for 23.08% of
the cases that we study, well above the 8.8% average registered between 1960 and 2006 (Hajzler,
2012). The fact that these trends still hold goes in line with the twomain explanations presented
in Kobrin (1980) to understandwhy these sectors are such popular targets for host governments.
On the one hand, communications and utilities are considered key to national security. On the
other hand, extractive industries are attractive targets if the economy largely depends on them,
as in the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia and Zimbabwe.
Table 4.2: Frequency of events by ICB industry
All Pre-Exprop. Warnings Forced divestments
FD/W
Industry ICB code Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel.
Oil & Gas 1 41 35.34% 30 38.96% 11 28.21% 35.43%
Basic Materials 1000 27 23.28% 17 22.08% 10 25.64% 58.82%
Industrials 2000 13 11.21% 8 10.39% 5 12.82% 62.50%
Consumer goods 3000 7 6.03% 6 7.79% 1 2.56% 16.67%
Health care 4000 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
Consumer Serv. 5000 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
Telecom 6000 3 2.59% 1 1.30% 2 5.13% 200%
Utilities 7000 16 13.79% 7 9.09% 9 23.08% 107%
Financials 8000 9 7.76% 8 10.39% 1 2.56% 12.50%
Total 116 116 100% 77 100% 39 100%
Another way to assess the importance of these sectors for host governments is to determine the
proportion ofwarnings in each sector thatmaterialized into forceddivestments. The last column
in Table 4.2 shows the materialized warnings as a percentage of the total warnings. In other
words, it represents the number of forced divestments preceded by warnings, as a proportion
of total warnings. On average, this proportion is close to 50%. Although these results may have
some caveats19, we may see that for rms in the nancial sector (ICB 8000), only 12.5% of the
warnings were followed by forced divestments. In contrast, communications (ICB 6000) and
utilities (ICB 7000) are associated with a large proportion of warnings ending up as effective
forced divestments. Firms pertaining to Oil & Gas sector (ICB 1000) display a relatively lower
proportion20, whereas Basic materials and Industrial are above average. In the case of the Oil &
Gas industry, a possible explanation of the relatively low gure is the nature of the deals made
by host governments in this sector: oftentimes, they would aim for a controlling stake, instead
of a 100% stake21.
4.4.2 Stock prices and market data
Weuse log-returns on the stocks’ total return index provided by Data Stream, which controls for
dividends. Regarding themarket variables, since we deal with stocks from all over the world, we
calculate the market returns rm,t on the index provided by DataStream for each market. These
18An act is dened by Kobrin (1980, p. 72) as "the forced divestment of any number of rms in a single industry in a
single country in a given year", and this is the denition followed by Minor (1994) and Hajzler (2012).
19Since we do not have the universe of pre-expropriation warnings and forced divestments, it may be the case that
some of the warnings that we analyze ended up as forced divestments, without being included in our sample.
20The big exceptionwas Libya, where the civil unrest started almost just after the government threatened to nationalize
the oil sector.
21In the oil sector nationalization processes in Venezuela, for example, the announcement affected all the operating
rms, but the actual nationalization (transfer of shares) only affected those rms with controlling stakes in the projects.
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are value-weighted indexes for each stock market. The reason for using data from the home
market of the parent company is that usually the stocks are more liquid there than in other ex-
changes, due to the well-known "home-bias" effect.
4.5 Results, robustness and sub-samples
4.5.1 Baseline results: Reaction of the stock market
In this section,wepresentCARsby typeof event, using themethodologydescribed in Section 4.3:
CARs (equation 4.3) are computed by estimating the model given by equation 4.1, using Datas-
tream local market index. As for the event window, we consider several specications. First,
we assume that the market does not anticipate the events. This is tested with the [0, 0] and [0,
5] windows; the latter accounts for the possibility that the market needs an extended learning
period, while the rst one assumes that the market immediately digests all relevant information
on the event day. Next, we allow for the market to anticipate the event, so that abnormal returns
appear a few days before the event. Therefore, we use the [-5, 0] and [-5, 5] windows.
Table 4.3 presents mean CARs as predicted from themodel in equation 4.1. We nd that, overall,
expropriation-related events, generate an average signicant loss of 1.09% on the event day, and
that the market keeps learning about these events, as the loss accumulates to a signicant 1.41
% ve days after the events. However, we do not nd evidence of market anticipation because
losses on the [-5, 0] and [-5, 5] windows are below the ones in the [0, 0] and [0, 5] windows. This
is corroborated in Figure 4.2, since the biggest losses are observed after the event has occurred22.
Table 4.3: Average CARs, traditional methodology
Event type
CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.0979%* -1.4001%** -0.88% -1.1811%* 116
Pre-expropriation warnings -1.0130%* -1.9591%*** -0.44% -1.3872%*** 77
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.21% 1.19% 0.71% 2.11% 37
Ann. Exprop. -2.42% -11.28% 7.01% -1.86% 1
Occupation 0.17% -2.01% -0.14% -2.32% 11
Threat -2.0525%* -3.9548%*** -2.15% -4.0478%** 22
Transitory Revocation -4.6808%** -12.4701%** -4.1086%** -11.8978%*** 6
Forced Divestments -1.27% -0.26% -1.82% -0.81% 39
Expropriations -2.09% -2.07% -2.67% -2.65% 21
Forced Sales 0.11% 2.5520%* 1.4041%* 3.8423%*** 14
Permanent revocation -1.99% -0.70% -10.0456%*** -8.75% 4
Note: Average CARs obtained from estimation of equation (1), excluding from the sample log returns with absolute value above
40%. Signicance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identied by *, **, and ***, respectively, and are based on the Generalized Rank T-test
proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), using the asymptotic distribution of the test, and conrming these results by the means of its
exact distribution.
Figure 4.2: Average CARs: Full sample
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation 4.1, excluding from the
sample log returns with absolute value above 40%. Event window centered in the event date.
22A look at Figure 4.2 suggests exploring the possibility that the market anticipates these news only one or two days
before the event. Although not reported here, the results for event windows of [-2, 0], [-2, 2] and [-2, 5] do not show a
signicant anticipation effect either.
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Whenwe analyze by type of event, we nd that pre-expropriationwarnings convey a borderline
signicant loss of 1.01% on the event day that increases to a signicant 1.96% over a ve-day
period. Disaggregating warnings, our results seem to support Hypothesis 1a, since we nd that
announcements of nationalization do not have clear effects on the stock price of parent rms.
As for Hypothesis 1b, althoughwe cannot provide signicance levels for the only announcement
of expropriation left in our sample, there are signs of themarket reacting negatively on the event
day and continuing to learn about it over a ve-day period. Graphical inspection of the CARs in
Figure 4.3 agrees with this result; what is more, it suggests that the expropriation announcement
came as a big surprise for the market. Hypothesis 1c, that occupations have a negative effect on
the parent rms’ stock returns, is not supported by our data, although the CARs do move in the
expected direction, as conrmed by Figure 4.3. This may suggest that occupations are not taken
as credible threats by the market.
Hypothesis 1d is supported, since threats imply a borderline signicant loss of 2.05%on the event
day that adds up to a signicant 3.96% loss when we allow for an extended learning period.
Finally, Hypothesis 1e goes in line with the results observed for transitory permit revocations,
which are associated with a large and signicant market response: on the event day, the mean
fall in parent rms’ stock prices is 4.68%, and the loss keeps growing to a signicant 12.47% ve
days after the revocation of the permit. Although losses on the [-5, 0] and [-5, 5] windows are
signicant, they provide little evidence of the market anticipating the event, when we compare
their CARs magnitude with the [0, 0] and [0, 5] windows. This is consistent with the evolution of
CARs presented on the rightmost panel of Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Average CARs: Pre-expropriationWarnings, by type of event
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation (1), excluding from the sample log returnswith absolute value above
40%. Event window centered in the event date.
Forced divestments as a whole are not signicant. Analyzing each type of forced divestment,
we nd that forced sales do not generate signicant abnormal returns on the event day, but are
associated with a borderline signicant gain of 2.55% that accumulates over ve days after the
event day (i.e. [0, 5] window). Anticipation of the event also plays an important role: there are
signicant mean gains of 1.40% and 3.84% that appear when we calculate CARs for the [-5, 0]
and [-5, 5] windows. Figure 4.4 lets us appreciate this dynamics more clearly: there is a clear
positive trend for the CARs during the event window. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2a: in
view of the catastrophic alternative of an expropriation, the fact that the parent rm can close a
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dealwith the government to sell its assetsmay seemquite a positive result tomarket participants.
Besides, anticipation is a plausible result if we consider that information leakagesmay arise from
the company’s side, since it is its decision to accept the government’s deal at last.
Outright expropriations do not have a signicant impact on the stock price of the parent rms,
although the graphic evolution of CARs in Figure 4.4 shows a small negative cumulative mar-
ket response around the event day. This means that Hypothesis 2b is not supported by our data,
which is somewhat puzzling, since the nature of the event implies the loss of property or control
rights over a facility, and thus its expected future stream of cash ows –let alone the high prob-
ability of obtaining no compensation for the subsidiary-. However, taking a closer look to the
sample of outright expropriations, only 5 out of our 14 events are what we could call "surprising
expropriations": they were not associated with previous warnings by the host government. This
suggests that the information may have been incorporated by the time the expropriation nally
occurred.
Finally, permanent rescissions are associated with negative effects in all cases, but only convey
a signicant loss of 10.05% over the [-5, 0] window, meaning that the market largely anticipates
the event, but that its effect over the stock price vanishes quickly from the market, as Figure 4.4
seems to imply. Thus, we nd some support for Hypothesis 2c.
Figure 4.4: Average CARs: Forced Divestments, by type of event
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation (1), excluding from the
sample log returns with absolute value above 40%. Event window centered in the event date.
In summary, at the aggregate levelwend that expropriation-related events are associatedwith a
signicant loss on the event day. However, we donot nd evidence of themarket anticipating the
events. In the case of warnings, there is a signicant loss on the event day that increases twofold
over a ve-day period. Disaggregating warnings, we nd some support for Hypothesis 1a, 1d and
1e, but the support is less clear in the case of Hypothesis 1c. The group of forced divestments
does not have a signicant effect. Analyzing each type, we nd that the results for forced Sales
are consistent with Hypothesis 2a, and the results for permanent rescissions are consistent with
Hypothesis 2c. However, the results for outright expropriations do not support Hypothesis 2b.
4.5.2 Robustness checks
Alternative methodology
In order to test whether our results are subject to the methodology we have employed, we use
an alternative specicationmotivated by Dube et al. (2011), which captures the abnormal returns
as a shock to the parent rm stock returns. The model we estimate is:
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + γeEi,t(k) + ui,t (4.4)
Where ri,t is the return on rm i’s stock price, rm,t is the return on themarket index23, andEi,t(k)
is an indicator variable that takes the valueof oneduring the k-day length eventwindow, and zero
23The regression estimated by Dube et al. (2011) includes four Fama-French factors. In our setting, however, we restrict
the model to include only the market index. The reason is that data for the four-factor Fama-Frenchmodel are available
only for U.S. rms, whereas our sample contains parent rms based in several countries.
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otherwise24. In that fashion, this model lets parameter γe measure the average daily abnormal
returnover the k-dayperiod, for event type e, as a transitory shock to theprocess. The cumulative
abnormal return is then computed as kγe. As in the case of the traditional methodology, we
consider different specications for the CAR period, for t ranging between −5 and 5, with zero
representing the event day. Equation 4.4 is estimated for a window t ∈ [−245, 25].
Table 4.4 presents the results of the estimation of Equation 4.4 for each event category, as well as
for the whole sample. We can appreciate that the events effects are virtually the same as in the
traditional event study methodology. Furthermore, given the setting of the model in equation
4.4, we can now supply some signicance for the effect of the announcement of expropriation
in our sample: in line with the results observed in Figure 4.3, the event comes as quite a shock to
the market on the announcement day, with a signicant loss of 2.39% that keeps accumulating
during ve days after the event. Thus, we can now talk about a partial support for Hypothesis 2b,
with a careful reading of the result25.
Table 4.4: Average CARs, alternative methodology.
Event type
CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.1027%** -1.4688%* -0.91% -1.27% 116
Pre-expropriation warnings -1.0430%** -2.0575%** -0.52% -1.54% 77
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.25% 1.09% 0.64% 2.02% 37
Ann. Exprop. -2.3909%*** -11.7468%* 7.27% -1.97% 1
Occupation 0.17% -2.1499%* -0.21% -2.58% 11
Threat -2.09% -4.1632%* -2.29% -4.4034%* 22
Transitory Revocation -4.6796%** -11.7874%*** -3.43% -11.3383%** 6
Forced Divestments -1.22% -0.27% -1.71% -0.72% 39
Expropriations -2.00% -1.88% -2.19% -2.06% 21
Forced Sales 0.11% 2.3411%** 1.29% 3.5463%** 14
Permanent revocation -2.00% -0.47% -10.1934%** -8.75% 4
Note: We calculate average CARs as kγe from the estimation of equation 4.4, using Data Stream market index and robust standard
errors. Signicance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identied by *, **, and ***, respectively, and based on the largest between robust and
cluster standard errors. We exclude from the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%.
The fact that the results obtained through both methodologies are so similar seems to con-
rm that expropriation actions do affect the stock price of parent rms, and that different types
of actions imply different reactions of the stock market. Of particular interest is the effect of
forced sales on stock prices of parent rms, which so far has been thought to be negative (e.g.
Shcherbakova (2010)). The possibility of the rm coming to an agreement with the government
towards the sale of its stake in the host country sends the market a positive signal: in spite of
possible delays in the payment, and a transfer of assets below fair value, it is muchmore positive
than the catastrophic alternative of an expropriation.
Time-Shifted placebos
In order tomake sure that the signicance of our results is not amere coincidence, in the fashion
of Dube et al. (2011) and Luechinger and Moser (2014), we shift our events 20, 40, and 60 days
backwards and then estimate themarketmodel (equation 4.1). Table 4.5.2 presents the results for
the 1-day and 11-day windows. Except for permanent revocations, none of the CARs associated
with our event types are signicant –even at the 10% level. A closer look at the case of per-
manent revocations, where we have three rms with four revoked permits, indicates that they
were subject to several other events during these dates: negative earnings reports (Crystallex and
Anglo-American PLC), transitory permit revocations (First Quantum Minerals), and generalized
industrymovements in the home country (Anglo American). Thus, these results seem to support
that the CARs we nd signicant are a consequence of the events that we study and proves the
importance of looking for confounding effects on the dates of interest.
24In principle, Ei,t(k) = 1 represents the case where the whole rm is at stake of being subject of forced divestment.
Dube et al. (2011) interact the associated parameter γe by the value of the subsidiary relative to the parent rm to estimate
the actual reaction of the market. However, given the difculty to obtain accurate information on subsidiary value for
our sample, we leave this issue for a posterior part of our research.
25The announcement of expropriation involved a Mexican food producer’s operations in Venezuela, and it occurred
after the rm had been subject to a previous occupation.
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Table 4.5: Average CARs, alternative methodology.
Event type –60 days shift –40 days shift –20 days shift
[-60,-60] [-65,-55] [-40,-40] [-45,-35] [-20,-20] [-25,-15]
Pre-ExpropriationWarnings
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.3505% 1.4111% -0.3984% 0.6655% 0.0869% 2.2340%
(0.69) (0.91) (0.19) (0.66) (0.63) (0.89)
Ann. Exprop. -2.3789% -1.9342% 2.0125% -1.0626% -0.2278% 0.0409%
– – – – – –
Occupation 0.4208% 2.8162% -0.4702% -1.0688% -0.6245% -0.1200%
(0.31) (0.91) (0.11) (0.21) (0.15) (0.62)
Threat 1.2549% 4.0360% 0.5789% -1.8096% -0.2148% 1.0899%
(0.93) (0.92) (0.83) (0.12) (0.36) (0.48)
Transitory Revocation 0.4588% -1.8241% -0.4756% 1.7809% 1.7343% -2.8945%
(0.68) (0.5) (0.66) (0.36) (0.9) (0.14)
Forced Divestments
Expropriations -0.7474% -1.8682% 0.3045% 1.5654% 0.9031% -0.3610%
(0.31) (0.29) (0.57) (0.29) (0.56) (0.52)
Forced Sales 0.1847% 1.5813% -0.3593% -2.3812% -0.3411% -0.2293%
(0.31) (0.12) (0.69) (0.99) (0.92) (0.9)
Permanent revocation -0.3004% -6.9791%*** 0.9999% -0.5880% -1.0564% -5.8745%***
(0.21) (0) (0.51) (0.78) (0.11) (0)
Note: Average CARs obtained from estimation of equation 1. We use an estimation window of [-245,-130], and exclude from the
sample log returns with absolute value above 40%. P-values in parentheses. Signicance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identied by *,
**, and ***, respectively, and are based on the Generalized Rank T-test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), using the asymptotic
distribution of the test, and conrming these results by the means of its exact distribution.
4.5.3 The effect of Venezuela
Given the importance of Venezuela within our sample (more than 50% of the events), it is worth
exploring to what extent results change once we exclude this country from the sample, as well
as the dynamics of market reactions in Venezuela as separate case. Since Venezuela constitutes
a unique scenario where expropriations were the order of the day, we expect the market to in-
corporate all the information regarding the expropriation risk facing rms that had operations
in the country during the period we study. In that sense, this setting offers the perfect oppor-
tunity to check whether the market thinks of pre-expropriation warnings as credible threats. If
that is the case, we should observe a larger abnormalmarket reaction towards pre-expropriation
warnings than in the case of other countries.
Tables 4.6 through 4.9 present the results for the samples ex-Venezuela (tables 4.6 and 4.7), and
Venezuela (tables 4.8 and 4.9), using both the traditional event study methodology and the alter-
native proposed by Dube et al. (2011). As before, very similar results are obtained through both
methods, but in this case their statistical signicance only coincides in some types of events.
In the ex-Venezuela sample, we do not nd signicant reactions from themarket in the full sam-
ple or in the group of pre-expropriationwarnings. In the latter group, only transitory revocations
convey a signicant loss of about 4.6% on the event day and that the market needs some time
to adjust to the news, since the return accumulated over a ve-day period is a signicant -7.5%;
this is the case for both methodologies, which suggests that our results are robust. In the case
of forced divestments, permanent revocations convey a signicant loss of around 5.6% during
the event day, while Forced Sales are associated with a signicant gain accumulated ve days
following the event, and over an 11-day window: there is both anticipation and learning for this
type of event. This is consistent with the idea that there may be information leakages on the
rm’s willingness to close the deal with the host government.
In contrast with the results above, for the sample of Venezuela, we nd that the set of pre-
expropriation warnings generates a rather large abnormally negative market response. The re-
sults also suggest that the market takes some time in digesting the news, as the loss accumulates
ve days after the event. Besides, to some extent, there is anticipation as the loss is bigger for
the [-5, 5] window than for the [0, 5] window. Disaggregating by type of event, although we can-
not provide meaningful results based on the traditional methodology for transitory revocations
and announcement of expropriation (there is only one of each left in our sample), the alterna-
tive methodology suggests that these are highly signicant. For the case of the expropriation
announcement, the results suggest that it comes as a surprise for the market, which requires
some time to fully digest the news, since the returns for the [-5, 0] and the [-5, 5] windows are
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Table 4.6: Traditional Methodology, Rest of the world
Event type CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.14% -1.4786%* 0.04% -0.30% 68
Pre-expropriation warnings -0.53% -0.8136%** 1.09% 0.81% 53
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.13% 1.91% 2.88% 4.92% 14
Ann. Exprop. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 0
Occupation 0.47% -2.7100%*** 2.9358%** -0.24% 2
Threat 0.25% -0.8218%* 0.63% -0.44% 17
Transitory Revocation -4.6808%** -7.5343%** -3.2860%** -6.1395%*** 5
Forced Divestments -2.67% -3.20% -2.72% -3.25% 15
Expropriations -3.29% -7.04% -3.65% -7.40% 9
Forced Sales 0.16% 9.2833%* 2.64% 11.7666%* 4
Permanent revocation -5.5801%*** -3.91% -10.2138%*** -8.5411%* 2
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation 4.1, excluding from the sample log returns with absolute value
above 40%. Event window centered in the event date. Signicance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identied by *, **, and ***, respectively,
and are based on the Generalized Rank T-test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), using the asymptotic distribution of the test, and
conrming these results by the means of its exact distribution.
Table 4.7: Alternative Methodology, Rest of the world
Event type
CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.12% -1.49% -0.02% -0.35% 68
Pre-expropriation warnings -0.55% -0.88% 0.97% 0.66% 53
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.17% 1.78% 2.71% 4.7665%* 14
Ann. Exprop. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 0
Occupation 0.48% -3.20% 3.09% -0.08% 2
Threat 0.24% -0.87% 0.45% -0.70% 17
Transitory Revocation -4.6796%** -7.4902%** -3.29% -6.12% 5
Forced Divestments -2.56% -3.14% -2.64% -3.04% 15
Expropriations -3.07% -6.92% -3.10% -6.97% 9
Forced Sales 0.09% 7.6816%** 2.23% 9.4728%** 4
Permanent revocation -5.6393%*** -4.05% -10.48% -8.99% 2
Note: We calculate average CARs as kγe from the estimation of equation 4.4, using Data Streammarket index. Signicance levels of
10%, 5%, and 1% are identied by *, **, and ***, respectively, and are based on the largest between robust and cluster standard errors. We
exclude from the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%.
not signicant, while returns for the [0, 0] and the [0, 5] windows are substantial and signicant.
As for the transitory revocation, the results suggest a large reaction from themarket over the ve
days that follow the event, as well as some anticipation. Threats are also associated with large
negativemarket responses that are signicant, and suggest both learning and anticipation. These
results are consistent with the idea that, given the history of forced divestments in this country,
any warning made by the government regarding the possible involuntary divestment of a rm
is interpreted by the market as a credible threat.
In the case of actual forced divestments, we nd that the market anticipates the permanent re-
vocation of permits for the two cases in our sample, since during the ve days previous to the
event and up to its occurrence, the loss is above 8.8% (for both estimations). There is a rebound
effect because the return on the event day is a positive and signicant 1.6%, but the rebound is
not signicant during the ve days after the event.
4.6 Explaining CARs: The effect of sector vulnerability and po-
litical risk
Several variables may offer clues about the likelihood of an expropriation related event’s occur-
rence, providing investors with valuable information. For example, as stated in Section 4, rms
operating in some sectors are more likely to be forced to divest. In particular, Table 4.2 indicates
thatOil&Gas, Basicmaterials, andUtilities sectors are themost vulnerable to forceddivestments.
This sectorial characteristic may shape investors reaction towards governmental measures re-
lated to forced divestments. In order to determine the effect of sector vulnerability on the size
of CARs, we dene a dummy variable Vi that takes the value of one when the rm operates in a
vulnerable sector, and zero otherwise. Nevertheless, as we have explained, nationalizations are
a very special case of forced divestments, with a different impact on the size of CARs. Therefore,
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Table 4.8: Traditional Methodology, Venezuela
Event type CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.07% -1.3315%* -1.64% -1.91% 63
Pre-expropriation warnings -1.50% -3.0833%*** -1.9519%* -3.5378%*** 39
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.27% 0.7539%** -0.62% 0.40% 23
Ann. Exprop. -2.42% -11.28% 7.01% -1.86% 1
Occupation 0.11% -1.87% -0.87% -2.84% 9
Threat -9.8691%*** -14.6068%*** -12.2875%* -17.0252%** 5
Transitory Revocation n.d -32.47% -3.82% -36.28% 1
Forced Divestments -0.35% 1.50% -1.15% 0.70% 24
Expropriations -1.1133%** 1.91% -1.75% 1.28% 12
Forced Sales 0.10% 0.68% 0.91% 1.4935%** 10
Permanent revocation 1.6053%*** 3.32% -8.8030%* -7.09% 2
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation 4.1, excluding from the sample log returns with absolute value
above 40%. Event window centered in the event date. Signicance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identied by *, **, and ***, respectively,
and are based on the Generalized Rank T-test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), using the asymptotic distribution of the test, and
conrming these results by the means of its exact distribution.
Table 4.9: Alternative Methodology, Venezuela
Event type
CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.0896%* -1.45% -1.6520%* -2.03% 63
Pre-expropriation warnings -1.5412%* -3.2195%** -1.96% -3.6797%** 39
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.30% 0.66% -0.62% 0.34% 23
Ann. Exprop. -2.3909%*** -11.7468%* 7.27% -1.97% 1
Occupation 0.10% -1.95% -0.97% -3.0955%* 9
Threat -9.9917%* -15.3754%* -11.64% -16.9337%* 5
Transitory Revocation n.d. -37.6055%*** -4.22% -38.8911%*** 1
Forced Divestments -0.35% 1.45% -1.15% 0.65% 24
Expropriations -1.13% 1.86% -1.56% 1.44% 12
Forced Sales 0.12% 0.59% 0.91% 1.41% 10
Permanent revocation 1.6148%*** 3.43% -9.8811%* -8.50% 2
Note: We calculate average CARs as kγe from the estimation of equation 4.4, using Data Stream market index and robust standard
errors. Signicance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identied by *, **, and ***, respectively, and are based on the largest between robust and
cluster standard errors. We exclude from the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%.
we add a variable, Ni, that is equal to one if the event is a nationalization, and a variable NVi,
which is an interaction term between Vi andNi. The model is presented in equation 4.5.
CARi = β0 + β1Ni + β2Vi + β3NVi + i (4.5)
In principle, if the sector were vulnerable, one would expect investors to incorporate such in-
formation into their valuation, so that the reaction of stock prices is somewhat smaller when the
event takes place. However, this may not be the case for nationalizations. To see why, remember
that for forced sales, we expect (and nd) CARs to be positive for this type of event because (i)
there is a large uncertainty that gets resolved the day the rm agrees to the nationalization of its
subsidiary, and (ii) nationalizations can be considered the lesser of two evils. Besides, the fact that
a sector is vulnerable means that the government is fond of it. All this results in a lower success
probability assigned to the positive outcome of a forced sale in a vulnerable sector than in one
that is not vulnerable: when the nationalization is realized in a vulnerable sector, the market’s
reaction is stronger. This being said, we expect β1 < 0, β2 > 0, β3 > 0.
The second and third columns of Table 4.10 present the results for equation 4.5 for the [0,0] and
[0,5] windows. Abnormal returns on the event day have a positive and signicant relationship
withNV , which is the interaction between vulnerability and nationalization. The fact that β3 > 0
implies that themarket’s reaction is much stronger for nationalizations carried out in vulnerable
sectors, providing some support for our hypothesis.
However, besides sector vulnerability, the level of political risk of the host country may also
explain the size of the response towards an expropriation related action. Investors can access
different measures or proxies for political risk through either readily available indexes or, well,
thenews. To estimate the impact of this variable on the size of CARs, weuse PRSGroup’s Regional
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Table 4.10: CARs, vulnerability and political risk
Vulnerability Political risk
Dep. Var.: CARs [0, 0] [0, 5] [0, 0] [0, 5]
Ni -0.00006 -0.00267 - -
Vi -0.01258 0.00603 - -
NVi 0.01903** 0.05246* - -
Pi - - -0.00053 -0.00009
NPi - - 0.00031*** 0.00091**
Constant -0.00387 -0.02308*** 0.01095 -0.01485
R-squared 0.0216 0.0233 0.017 0.0183
n 114 114 112 112
Note: CARs obtained from estimating equation 4.1 constitute the dependent variable for all models in the table, using Huber-White
robust standard errors.
Political Risk Index26, which is free to access on PRS’s website. The index represents an overall
measure of risk for a given country, taking into account variables such as turmoil, expropriation,
and other risks.
The idea behind the model presented in equation 4.6 is similar in spirit to that presented in the
case of vulnerability. Wewould expect that if the event is a nationalization, the larger the level of
political risk, the larger the CARs. This is because investors might have a perception that riskier
countries are associated with a larger probability of the nationalization process ending in the
catastrophic alternative of expropriation.
CARi = δ0 + δ1Pi + δ2NPi + i (4.6)
According to the columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.10, the only signicant variable in regression (6)
is the interaction term, and it has the expected sign. This supports the idea that resolved un-
certainty for nationalizations occurring in an already rather uncertain environment triggers a
positive response from the market.
4.7 Final remarks
Events related to expropriations are likely to generate a reaction in stock returns since sharehold-
ers risk losing their stake in the expropriated rmwithout receiving a proper compensation. We
dene expropriations, following Truitt (1970), as those events where the sovereign seizes pri-
vately owned tangible property. However, through an extensive investigation on expropriation
events, wend that theremaybe several types of actions related to thedeedof expropriation. We
divide these actions between pre-expropriation warnings (announcements of expropriations,
nationalizations, occupations, threats, and transitory permit revocations), which do not neces-
sarily imply asset seizing by the government, and the actual event of forced divestments (forced
sales, outright expropriations, and permanent permit rescissions), where the rm losses/cedes
property or control rights on its business in the expropriating country.
In order to determine whether these events actually have an impact on the value of the parent
rm, we conduct an event study using a novel data set. In general, as expected, we nd thatmost
expropriation related events are associated with a value loss for the parent rm shareholders;
among these, events associated with permit revocations are the ones that generate the largest
negative market reaction among the events in our sample. A rather unexpected nding is that
outright expropriations do not appear to be a negative surprise for the market, since we do not
nd any signicant abnormal returns associated with them. One possible explanation is that
only ve of the expropriations in our sample were unannounced.
Nevertheless, when it comes to forced sales, we no longer expect it to be a negative announce-
ment for the parent rm, unlike the approach observed in the extant literature. We hypothesize
26The index, calculated annually, is available for several years at https://www.prsgroup.com/category/risk-index. The
original series decreases with political risk, but we rescale it to reect a larger value as political risk grows, just to make
interpretation a bit easier.
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that forced sales may be seen as a rather positive event by the market. This is because in lieu of
the alternative of having its assets seized by the host government, the parent firm locks in a deal
to transfer its assets for a stipulated price, resembling a regular asset sale. When we analyze the
data, we find a consistent positive reaction of the market towards forced sales, which is a novel
result, as far as we know.
When we analyze the results separating Venezuela from the rest of the world, we find that the
market interprets any pre-expropriation warning as a credible threat and tends to react vig-
orously whenever the government signals the intention to expropriate. As for the rest of the
world, results for forced sales suggest anticipation and learning, indicating possible informa-
tion leakages on the side of the parent firm. However, warnings do not seem to alarm investors,
suggesting that they are not necessarily taken seriously if the country is other than Venezuela.
The cross-section of CARs suggests that these are explained to some extent by political risk and
sector vulnerability to expropriation. Particularly, our results suggest that nationalizations are
considered more positively than usual whenever the firm operates in a vulnerable sector or in a
high political risk country.
Further research could use this dataset to study the reaction of parent firms’ debt when a sub-
sidiary is affected by a governmental action that signals forced divestments, since debtors have
different incentives than shareholders. It can also be used to study more accurately determi-
nants of expropriations, as well as to analyze the impact of expropriations on sovereign risk.
4.8 Appendices
Appendix A: Example of a Nationalization Decree
In order to illustrate the process of nationalization, we take the case of Venezuela, which we
outline in Fig. A1. In general, a nationalization process has two phases: the negotiation of terms
and conditions under which control/stock transfer is going to be executed (phase 2) and, when
appropriate, the sale of stake to the government (phase 3). In the figure, Phase 1 refers to two
special nationalization cases inVenezuela’s hydrocarbons sector: firmshad todecide at this stage
whether they agreed to be taken into account for planning the migration from private to mixed
enterprises.
Figure 4.5: Scheme of a nationalization decree
Appendix B: Preliminary sample
Before checking for the existence of confounding events in our sample, we found that 71 firms
were affected by expropriation-related announcements 208 times (Table B1). These events oc-
curred in 12 countries, with Venezuela and Bolivia accounting for nearly 51% and 14% of them,
respectively.
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Table 4.11: Frequency of events by type
Event type Frequency Percent
Announcement of nationalization 58 27.88%
Announcement of expropriation 5 2.40%
Occupation 19 9.13%
Threat 47 22.60%
Contract revoked or end of concession 12 5.77%
Pre-ExpropriationWarnings 141 67.79%
Outright expropriation 31 14.90%
Forced sale 30 14.42%
Permanent Rescission of Contract 6 2.88%
Forced Divestment 67 32.21%
Total sample 208 100.00%
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